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ONE TOKE TOO FAR: THE DEMISE OF THE 
DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE’S 
EXTRATERRITORIALITY DOCTRINE 
THREATENS THE MARIJUANA-
LEGALIZATION EXPERIMENT 
CHAD DEVEAUX* 
Abstract: This Article argues that the pending feuds between neighboring states 
over marijuana decriminalization demonstrate the need for a strict doctrine limit-
ing a state’s regulatory authority to its own borders. Precedent recognizes that the 
dormant Commerce Clause (“DCC”) “precludes the application of a state statute 
to commerce that takes place wholly outside the State’s borders, whether or not 
the commerce has effects within the State.” This prohibition protects “the auton-
omy of the individual States within their respective spheres” by dictating that 
“[n]o state has the authority to tell other polities what laws they must enact or 
how affairs must be conducted.” But this principle was called into doubt in July 
2015 by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in an opinion by Judge 
(now Justice) Neil Gorsuch, which concluded that this “most dormant doctrine in 
[DCC] jurisprudence” had withered and died from nonuse. The Tenth Circuit’s 
conclusion, which approved Colorado’s purported direct regulation of coal-fired 
power generation in Nebraska, ironically coincided with Nebraska’s attempt to 
enjoin Colorado’s pot-friendly laws. Nebraska contends that Colorado’s commer-
cial pot market allows marijuana to “flow . . . into [Nebraska], undermining [its] 
own marijuana ban[], draining [its] treasur[y], and placing stress on [its] criminal 
justice system[].” While Colorado celebrated its newfound power to impose its 
legislative judgments on Nebraskans, the festivities might be short-lived. Colora-
do failed to recognize the impact the extraterritorial doctrine’s apparent demise 
may have on its own marijuana-legalization experiment. If Colorado is empow-
ered to regulate coal burning in Nebraska because of its effects in Colorado, what 
prevents Nebraska from projecting its own laws across the border to regulate 
Colorado marijuana transactions that affect a substantial number of Nebraskans? 
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“The intimate union of [the] states, as members of the same great political 
family; the deep and vital interests which bind them so closely together; 
should lead us . . . to presume a greater degree of comity, and friendship, 
and kindness towards one another, than we should be authorized to pre-
sume between foreign nations.”1 
INTRODUCTION 
Federalism is, as a mentor of mine once observed, a “glass . . . either half 
empty or half full, depending on the viewer’s standpoint.”2 Outside the limited 
bounds of “fundamental rights”—which the Constitution insulates from gov-
ernment intrusion3—states enjoy wide latitude to criminalize conduct that of-
fends the moral sensibilities of their respective polities.4 Recent conflicts be-
tween Colorado and its more socially conservative neighbors over marijuana 
decriminalization put this dynamic on display for all to see.5 Indeed, I am no 
stranger to this feud.6 
The Constitution “does not recognize a fundamental right to use . . . mari-
juana”—not even “to alleviate excruciating pain and human suffering.”7 But 
our charter demarks the floor, not the ceiling, of individual liberty. As Gerald 
Neuman noted, “[f]ederalism permits the majority in each state to choose how 
far above the constitutional minimum the exercise of fundamental rights will 
extend locally.”8 The states, as diverse and distinct political communities, may 
exercise this discretion in myriad ways. “Some states will afford more freedom 
than the mean; others will afford less than the mean. All states, in making these 
                                                                                                                           
 1 Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519, 590 (1839).  
 2 Gerald L. Neuman, Territorial Discrimination, Equal Protection, and Self-Determination, 135 
U. PA. L. REV. 261, 314 (1987). 
 3 Mass. Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312 (1976) (A state law that “interferes with 
the exercise of a fundamental right” must be invalidated unless it can survive strict scrutiny). 
 4 See Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 799–800 (1997) (upholding a state law prohibiting assisted 
suicide because it “neither infringe[d upon any] fundamental rights nor involve[d any] suspect classi-
fications” and thus was “entitled to a strong presumption of validity”). 
 5 See Kirk Siegler, Nebraska Says Colorado Pot Isn’t Staying Across the Border, NPR (Feb. 3, 
2015), http://www.npr.org/2015/02/03/382646498/nebraska-says-colorado-pot-isnt-staying-on-its-
side-of-the-border [https://perma.cc/8ETT-6R6X]. 
 6 See Chad DeVeaux & Anne Mostad-Jensen, Fear and Loathing in Colorado: Invoking the Su-
preme Court’s State-Controversy Jurisdiction to Challenge the Marijuana-Legalization Experiment, 
56 B.C. L. REV. 1829, 1837–43 (2015) (arguing that Colorado’s wide-open recreational marijuana 
market has created a transboundary nuisance under federal common law and Colorado should be re-
quired to share some of the proceeds of its experiment with its neighbors to offset cross-border harm it 
causes). 
 7 Raich v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d 850, 866 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 8 Neuman, supra note 2, at 314; accord Seth F. Kreimer, Lines in the Sand: The Importance of 
Borders in American Federalism, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 973, 974 (2002). 
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choices, will be exercising the independently valued freedom of local self-
determination within their respective spheres.”9 
This dichotomy has long been viewed as one of federalism’s great virtues. 
As one commentator noted just over a decade ago, “When citizens can choose 
among and compare the virtues of the permission of assisted suicide in Ore-
gon, covenant marriage in Louisiana, . . . and same-sex unions in Vermont, we 
are likely to have a society that is morally richer, practically freer, and person-
ally more fulfilling . . . .”10 And sometimes—as the Supreme Court’s recent 
recognition that the Fourteenth Amendment endows same-sex couples with a 
fundamental right to marry—such state-level experiments can shed light upon 
“unjustified inequality within our most fundamental institutions that once 
passed unnoticed and unchallenged.”11  
The ultimate embrace of same-sex marriage by the Court (and the court of 
public opinion)12—unthinkable when Vermont made the then-ground-breaking 
decision to recognize civil unions in 200013—demonstrates the merits of 
Brandeisian experimentation. “It is one of the happy incidents of the federal 
system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a 
laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the 
rest of the country.”14  But sometimes one state’s “experiment” produces 
harmful side-effects that extend beyond its borders. North Dakota’s lax regula-
tion of its coal-heavy power industry produces pollution that falls upon neigh-
boring Minnesota.15 Likewise, Colorado’s embrace of a wide-open commercial 
marijuana market produces harm that extends well beyond its borders.16  
Reasonable minds can differ over whether marijuana’s negative externali-
ties justify the costs of its prohibition. But fanciful assertions that pot is an 
                                                                                                                           
 9 Neuman, supra note 2, at 314. 
 10 Kreimer, supra note 8, at 974.  
 11 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2603 (2015).  
 12 In 2001, fifty-seven percent of Americans opposed same-sex marriage. Pew Research Ctr., 
Changing Attitudes on Gay Marriage, PEW RES. CTR. (May 12, 2016), http://www.pewforum.org/
2015/07/29/graphics-slideshow-changing-attitudes-on-gay-marriage/ [https://perma.cc/WH8V-VAXC]. 
Today, only thirty-seven percent oppose it. Id.  
 13 See id.  
 14 New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).  
 15 See North Dakota v. Heydinger, 15 F. Supp. 3d 891, 897–98, 919 (D. Minn. 2014) (striking 
down Minnesota’s purported direct regulation of coal-fired electrical generation in North Dakota as 
violative of the DCC). But see Robert D. Cheren, Environmental Controversies “Between Two or 
More States”, 31 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 105, 188 (2014) (discussing how states, like Minnesota, 
should be able to invoke the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction to sue sister states for “emissions of 
air pollution from coal-fired” powered plants because such plants “significantly contribute, to substan-
tial adverse effects on the health and welfare of citizens of the [plaintiff] State,” and cause “damage to 
the State’s natural resources and economy, and harm to the State’s finances”).  
 16 See infra notes 17–22 and accompanying text (discussing some of the harmful effects of mari-
juana); see also DeVeaux & Mostad-Jensen, supra note 6, at 1855–59 (addressing transboundary 
spillover effects of Colorado’s marijuana market).  
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unmitigated social good are pure fiction.17 Marijuana abuse causes “long-
lasting changes in brain function that can jeopardize educational, professional, 
and social achievements.”18 These changes can manifest themselves in “im-
pairments in memory and attention,” and “significant declines in IQ.”19 
Though medical marijuana benefits many,20 assertions that pot legalization is a 
free lunch—while sometimes taken at face value by the media21—enjoy no 
support in peer-reviewed scholarship or “accepta[nce] in the relevant scientific 
community.”22 
Although alcohol raises most of these same concerns,23 the paradoxical 
treatment of the two vices does not alter the constitutional calculus. Marijuana 
                                                                                                                           
 17 The National Organization for the Reform of Marijuana Laws (“NORML”) has argued that 
though “Cannabis [use] . . . has a negative impact on decision time and trajectory,” stoned drivers do 
not “represent a traffic safety risk” because marijuana consumption “leads to a more cautious style of 
driving.” Marijuana and Driving: A Review of the Scientific Evidence, NORML, http://norml.org/
library/item/marijuana-and-driving-a-review-of-the-scientific-evidence [https://perma.cc/AKN2-
XRY2] (last visited Feb. 3, 2017). 
 18 Nora D. Volkow et al., Adverse Health Effects of Marijuana Use, 370 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2219, 
2225 (2014). “[I]maging studies” of regular marijuana users’ brains reveal “decreased activity in pre-
frontal regions and reduced volumes in the hippocampus.” Id. at 2220; see also Alan J. Budney et al., 
Marijuana Dependence and Its Treatment, 4 ADDICTION SCI. & CLINICAL PRAC. 4, 4 (2007) (observ-
ing that marijuana is addictive). 
 19 Volkow et al., supra note 18, at 2220, 2221; accord ROCKY MOUNTAIN HIGH INTENSITY 
DRUG TRAFFICKING AREA, THE LEGALIZATION OF MARIJUANA IN COLORADO: THE IMPACT 36 
(2014); Madeline H. Meier et al., Persistent Cannabis Users Show Neuropsychological Decline from 
Childhood to Midlife, 109 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S.A. E2657, E2661–E2662 (2012). 
 20 See James D. Abrams, Note, A Missed Opportunity: Medical Use of Marijuana Is Legally De-
fensible, 31 CAP. U.L. REV. 883, 909 (2003) (“Those who would use marijuana for treatment for nau-
sea and vomiting resulting from chemotherapy treatments or for combating the wasting associated 
with AIDS . . . cannot be considered marijuana abusers.”). 
 21 See Kim Chatelain, Marijuana Might Help in Fight Against Ebola, Doctor Says in Paper Re-
ported by Website, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE (Oct. 29, 2014), http://www.nola.com/health/
index.ssf/2014/10/marijuana_might_help_in_fight.html [https://perma.cc/8KDE-YGT8] (suggesting 
that marijuana may cure Ebola); Matt Ferner & Nick Wing, The 11 Stupidest Arguments Against Le-
galizing Marijuana, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 20, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/04/20/
stupid-arguments-against-legalizing-marijuana_n_5175880.html [https://perma.cc/H7CZ-7G4C] (as-
serting that marijuana-legalization opponents have premised their position in part on fears that 
“[l]egalization will cause mass zombification”); Anneli Rufus, Is Pot Good for Lungs? New Marijua-
na Study Adds to Health-Effects Debate, DAILY BEAST (Jan. 14, 2012), http://www.thedailybeast.
com/articles/2012/01/13/is-pot-good-for-lungs-new-marijuana-study-adds-to-health-effects-debate.
html [https://perma.cc/5LEV-V43U] (suggesting that smoking marijuana may increase lung function); 
Rick Simpson’s Hemp-Oil Medicine, HIGH TIMES (Nov. 13, 2013), http://web.archive.org/web/2013
1114074056/http://www.hightimes.com/read/rick-simpsons-hemp-oil-medicine (praising a “miracu-
lous cannabis-oil medicine” said to cure skin cancer and cervical cancer). 
 22 See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 141 (1999) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 23 See Martin D. Carcieri, Obama, the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Drug War, 44 AKRON L. 
REV. 303, 312 (2011) (“We are entitled to know how justice can really exist when adults who private-
ly consume marijuana are criminals while adults who consume far more dangerous substances like 
alcohol and tobacco, even in public, are within their rights for reasons that are widely understood.”). 
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prohibition triggers only the deferential rational-basis test.24 Under this stand-
ard, a law must be sustained so long as it can “be thought to further a legiti-
mate governmental goal, without reference to whether it does so at inordinate 
cost.”25 Prohibition furthers the legitimate objective of mitigating the refer-
enced harms associated with marijuana use. Thus, states are within their rights 
to outlaw the drug—as the majority have done. 
But states cannot, choose between decriminalization and prohibition in a 
vacuum. Marijuana is the most lucrative cash crop in the United States.26 The 
resulting “high demand for marijuana in the interstate market will draw” weed 
acquired in pot-friendly states “into that market” thereby having a “substantial 
effect on the supply and demand” of the drug in the black markets of prohibi-
tionist states.27 So how can states exercise their “freedom of local self-
determination” to “afford more freedom than the mean” or “less than the 
mean” with regard to marijuana policy?28 A state, like Colorado, that chooses 
to decriminalize the drug implicitly imposes its choice upon its neighbors, in-
hibiting their “freedom of local self-determination.”29 Conversely, if a prohibi-
tionist state, like Nebraska, is able to quell marijuana decriminalization in Col-
orado, then it interferes with the latter’s power to “afford more freedom than 
the mean.”30 Marijuana decriminalization, therefore, presents one of the most 
vexing federalism problems of the twenty-first century.31 
This constitutional quandary came into sharp focus in December 2014 
when Nebraska and Oklahoma sought to invoke the Supreme Court’s original 
jurisdiction32 to enjoin marijuana legalization in Colorado.33 Their ill-fated 
                                                                                                                           
 24 See Raich, 500 F.3d at 866. 
 25 Bd. of Trs. of State University of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989). 
 26 Nitya Venkataraman, Marijuana Called Top U.S. Cash Crop, ABC NEWS (Dec. 18, 2006), 
http://abcnews.go.com/Business/story?id=2735017 [https://perma.cc/QB7A-G6MC] (reporting on a 
study finding that marijuana is the most profitable cash crop in the U.S.). 
 27 Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 19 (2005). 
 28 Neuman, supra note 2, at 314. 
 29 See id. 
 30 See id. 
 31 Using the Coase Theorem (which argues “that if transaction costs are eliminated, ‘parties will 
negotiate the efficient solution to . . . nuisance problem[s]’”) as a guide, Anne Mostad-Jensen and I 
have argued that marijuana spillover is analogous to pollution and that pot-friendly states should com-
pensate their neighbors for harm caused by such spillover. DeVeaux & Mostad-Jensen, supra note 6, 
at 1840–43; accord id. at 1889–96 (suggesting that the Coase theorem could instruct courts on how to 
best address the cross-border market for drugs). 
 32 The Constitution expressly endows the Supreme Court with “original jurisdiction” over “Con-
troversies between two or more States.” U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. Congress has made the Court’s 
jurisdiction over such cases “exclusive.” 28 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2012). 
 33 See Complaint at 1, 28–29, Nebraska v. Colorado, 136 S. Ct. 1034 (2016) (No. 144); Brief in 
Support of Motion for Leave to File Complaint at 4, Nebraska, 136 S. Ct. 1034 (2016) (No. 144); 
Reply Brief in Support of Motion for Leave to File Complaint at 3, Nebraska, 136 S. Ct. 1034 (No. 
144). 
958 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 58:953 
complaint contended that “Colorado has created a dangerous gap in the federal 
drug control system,” enabling marijuana to flow “into neighboring states, un-
dermining [their] own marijuana bans, draining their treasuries, and placing 
stress on their criminal justice systems.”34 
Nebraska’s and Oklahoma’s suit coincided with another paradigm-
shattering change to the federalism covenant. In July 2015, the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit35 in Energy and Environment Legal Institute v. 
Epel—an opinion authored by Judge (now Justice) Neil Gorsuch—broke with 
nearly thirty years of precedent, positing that the Constitution generally per-
mits a state to directly regulate commercial activities beyond its borders that 
produce substantial effects within the state.36 The court opined that a trio of 
1980s Supreme Court opinions which purport to hold that the dormant Com-
merce Clause (“DCC”) “precludes the application of a state statute to com-
merce that takes place wholly outside of the State’s borders, whether or not the 
commerce has effects within the state”37 are no longer binding.38 
The Tenth Circuit ironically upheld Colorado’s purported regulation of 
commercial transactions in Nebraska—laws aimed at curbing reliance on Ne-
braska’s coal-fired power plants.39 Labeling the extraterritoriality case law “the 
                                                                                                                           
 34 Complaint, supra note 33, at 3–4. The Court refused to grant leave to the plaintiffs to file their 
complaint for unspecified reasons. Nebraska v. Colorado, 136 S. Ct. 1034, 1034 (2016). The Court 
likely rejected the case because of pleading mistakes. See DeVeaux & Mostad-Jensen, supra note 6, at 
1160–66. 
 35 Hereinafter, all references to “Circuit” refer to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the circuit refer-
enced.  
 36 Energy & Env’t Legal Inst. v. Epel, 793 F.3d 1169, 1173–75, 1177 (10th Cir. 2015). 
 37 Healy v. Beer Inst., Inc., 491 U.S. 324, 336 (1989) (quoting Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 
624, 642–43 (1982) (plurality opinion)); accord Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor 
Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 579 (1986); see also BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 572 (1996) 
(“[A] State may not impose . . . sanctions on violators of its laws with the intent of changing the tort-
feasors’ lawful conduct in other States.”). 
 38 Epel, 793 F.3d at 1173–75. Other courts have questioned the viability of the DCC extraterrito-
riality doctrine, but all ultimately concluded that the challenged statutes only incidentally affected 
extraterritorial transactions and thus did not implicate the doctrine. See Rocky Mountain Farmers 
Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070, 1104 (9th Cir. 2013); Ass’n des Eleveurs de Canards et d’Oies du 
Quebec v. Harris, 729 F.3d 937, 948–49 (9th Cir. 2013); Pac. Merch. Shipping Ass’n v. Goldstene, 
639 F.3d 1154, 1179 (9th Cir. 2011); Int’l Dairy Foods Ass’n v. Boggs, 622 F.3d 628, 647 (6th Cir. 
2010); IMS Health Inc. v. Mills, 616 F.3d 7, 29 (1st Cir. 2010), vacated sub nom. IMS Health Inc. v. 
Schneider, 564 U.S. 1051 (2011) (mem.). The Epel court upheld the challenged statute without decid-
ing whether it directly regulated extraterritorial commerce, but instead concluded that it did not matter 
because the extraterritoriality doctrine is no longer binding. Epel, 793 F.3d at 1173–75. Thus, in Epel, 
the Tenth Circuit became the first to hold (rather than to opine in dicta) that the extraterritoriality 
doctrine is dead. See id. 
 39 The Tenth Circuit upheld Colorado’s purported direct regulation of power plants that generate 
electricity by burning coal in states exporting electrical power to Colorado. Epel, 793 F.3d at 1174–
75. Colorado imports a significant amount of electricity from coal-fired plants in neighboring Nebras-
ka. GOVERNOR’S ENERGY OFFICE , 2010 COLORADO UTILITIES REPORT 15 (2010). 
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most dormant doctrine in dormant commerce clause jurisprudence,”40 Justice 
Gorsuch opined that the doctrine has died of atrophy, as the Supreme Court has 
not invoked it to invalidate a state law in more than a generation.41 Joining a 
growing chorus of critics who argue that “the extraterritoriality doctrine . . . is 
a relic of the old world with no useful role to play in the new,”42 the court pos-
ited that the DCC, in fact, only prohibits economic balkanization.43 Thus, 
states may presumably enforce non-protectionist laws that directly regulate 
extraterritorial conduct if that conduct “affects a substantial number of in-state 
residents”44—at least as long as the burden imposed on interstate commerce is 
not “clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.”45 
While Colorado celebrated its newfound power to impose its judgments 
on Nebraskans, the festivities might be short lived. Colorado failed to recog-
nize the impact that the extraterritorial doctrine’s apparent demise will have on 
its own marijuana-legalization experiment. Sauce for the goose is, after all, 
sauce for the gander.46 What prevents Nebraska from regulating Colorado ma-
rijuana transactions affecting a substantial number of Nebraska residents?47 
Part I of this Article provides background for the rise of the DCC’s extra-
territoriality doctrine, as well as its purported fall.48 Part II argues that the in-
                                                                                                                           
 40 Epel, 793 F.3d at 1170. 
 41 See id. at 1172. But see BMW of N. Am., 517 U.S. at 572 (invoking the extraterritoriality doc-
trine to invalidate a jury verdict punishing the defendant for engaging in out-of-state conduct that was 
lawful in the states where it was conducted, but illegal in the forum state). 
 42 Am. Beverage Ass’n v. Snyder, 700 F.3d 796, 812 (6th Cir. 2012) (Sutton, J., concurring), 
opinion amended and superseded, 735 F.3d 362 (6th Cir. 2014). Many jurists and most scholars now 
agree that the DCC’s extraterritoriality doctrine either is no longer good law or should be abandoned. 
See Epel, 793 F.3d at 1170; Ass’n des Eleveurs, 729 F.3d at 951; Am. Beverage Ass’n, 700 F.3d at 
812; Brannon P. Denning, Extraterritoriality and the Dormant Commerce Clause: A Doctrinal Post-
Mortem, 73 LA. L. REV. 979, 1008 (2013); Jack L. Goldsmith & Alan O. Sykes, The Internet and the 
Dormant Commerce Clause, 110 YALE L.J. 785, 790 (2001); Donald H. Regan, Siamese Essays: (I) 
CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America and Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine; (II) Extraterri-
torial State Legislation, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1865, 1908 (1987); Mark D. Rosen, Extraterritoriality and 
Political Heterogeneity in American Federalism, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 855, 863 (2002); Allen Rostron, 
The Supreme Court, the Gun Industry, and the Misguided Revival of Strict Territorial Limits on the 
Reach of State Law, 2003 L. REV. MICH. ST. U. DET. C.L. 115, 116; Recent Case, Dormant Com-
merce Clause—American Beverage Ass’n v. Snyder, 700 F.3d 796 (6th Cir. 2012), 126 HARV. L. 
REV. 2435, 2442 (2013).  
 43 See Epel, 793 F.3d at 1173. 
 44 IMS Health Inc., 616 F.3d at 44; see Epel, 793 F.3d at 1170–73. 
 45 IMS Health Inc., 616 F.3d at 42 n.51 (quoting Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 
(1970)); see Epel, 793 F.3d at 1171. 
 46 See Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 97 (1907) (“One cardinal rule, underlying all the rela-
tions of the States to each other, is that of equality of right. Each State stands on the same level with 
all the rest.”). 
 47 See IMS Health Inc., 616 F.3d at 44. 
48 See infra notes 50–279 and accompanying text. 
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terstate marijuana conflicts demonstrate the need for a vibrant extraterritoriali-
ty doctrine.49 
I. THE RISE AND PURPORTED FALL OF THE DCC’S  
EXTRATERRITORIALITY DOCTRINE 
The Constitution empowers Congress “[t]o regulate Commerce with for-
eign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.”50 Alt-
hough “the Commerce Clause is by its text an affirmative grant of power to 
Congress to regulate interstate and foreign commerce, the Clause has long 
been recognized as a self-executing limitation on the power of the States to 
enact laws imposing substantial burdens on such commerce.”51 By “be-
stow[ing] Congress with exclusive plenary powers,” the Clause inversely “de-
prives in like degree the states’ authority to regulate [those] activities” it en-
trusts Congress to regulate.52 Section A discusses some of the limitations im-
posed by the DCC.53 Section B discusses the purported demise of the DCC’s 
extraterritoriality doctrine.54 Section C posits that the reports of the extraterri-
toriality doctrine’s demise stem from a fundamental misunderstanding of the 
principle.55  
A. The DCC Bars Direct Regulation of Out-of-State Transactions 
1. The DCC Serves Three Distinct Constitutional Functions56 
Notwithstanding the Tenth Circuit’s 2015 decision in Energy and Envi-
ronment Legal Institute v. Epel, the Supreme Court has recognized, as I ob-
served six years ago, that the DCC serves three distinct constitutional func-
tions.57 First, it “prohibits economic protectionism—that is, regulatory 
measures designed to benefit in-state economic interests by burdening out-of-
state competitors.”58 This is now the DCC’s most familiar function.59 “If [one 
                                                                                                                           
49 See infra notes 280–365 and accompanying text. 
 50 U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 51 South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 87 (1984). 
 52 Kickapoo Tribe of Indians v. Kansas, 818 F. Supp. 1423, 1431 (D. Kan. 1993), vacated by 
Oklahoma v. Ponca Tribe of Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 1129 (1996) (mem.); accord Quill Corp. v. North 
Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 309 (1992). 
 53 See infra notes 56–128 and accompanying text.  
 54 See infra notes 129–171 and accompanying text.  
 55 See infra notes 172–279 and accompanying text. 
 56 The case discussions in this Section and the footnotes herein are drawn from and closely track 
the text of a prior Article. Chad DeVeaux, Lost in the Dismal Swamp: Interstate Class Actions, False 
Federalism, and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 995, 1005–08 (2011). 
 57 Id. 
 58 New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 273–74 (1988).  
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state], in order to promote the economic welfare of her [own industries], may 
guard them against competition with [out-of-state competitors], the door has 
been opened to rivalries and reprisals that were meant to be averted by subject-
ing commerce between the states to the power of the nation.”60 I have referred 
to this as the DCC’s “anti-protectionist function.”61 
Second, the DCC protects “the autonomy of the individual States within 
their respective spheres”: it “precludes the application of a state statute that 
regulates commerce that takes place wholly outside of the State’s borders, 
whether or not the State commerce has effects within the State.”62 The DCC 
dictates that “[n]o state has the authority to tell other polities what laws they 
must enact or how affairs must be conducted.”63 I have referred to this as the 
DCC’s “sovereign-capacity function.”64 
Finally, the DCC bars state regulations that “unduly burdens . . . com-
merce in matters where [national] uniformity is . . . essential for the function-
ing of commerce.”65 These are matters that by their nature are amenable to a 
single uniform regulatory authority, “the regulation of which is committed to 
Congress and denied to the States by the [DCC].”66 I call this the DCC’s “anti-
obstructionist function.”67 
Statutes implicating this last restriction are often said to “incidental[ly] 
regulat[e] . . . interstate commerce” because they induce regulated parties to 
alter nationwide conduct to conform to a particular state’s law.68 For example, 
California sets high emission standards on cars sold in the state.69 This regula-
tion induces automakers wishing to avoid operating separate assembly lines for 
California-bound vehicles to “sell only California-compliant cars . . . nation-
wide.”70 California’s law does not directly regulate out-of-state commerce. A 
Michigan automaker that sells a car in its own state that does not meet Califor-
nia’s rigorous standards faces no risk of prosecution by California authorities. 
Precedent recognizes that the sometimes-elusive distinction between “di-
rect” and “incidental” extraterritorial regulation is critically important.71 The 
                                                                                                                           
 59 See Cass R. Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1689, 
1705–06 (1984). 
 60 Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 522 (1935).  
 61 DeVeaux, supra note 56, at 1005. 
 62 Healy, 491 U.S. at 336. 
 63 Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n v. Meyer, 165 F.3d 1151, 1153 (7th Cir. 1999).  
 64 DeVeaux, supra note 56, at 1006. 
 65 Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373, 377 (1946). 
 66 Shafer v. Farmers’ Grain Co. of Embden, 268 U.S. 189, 199 (1925). 
 67 DeVeaux, supra note 56, at 1006. 
 68 Edgar, 457 U.S. at 640 (plurality opinion). 
 69 Am. Beverage Ass’n, 700 F.3d at 812 (Sutton, J., concurring). 
 70 Id. at 813. 
 71 See Brown-Forman, 476 U.S. at 579–80. 
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Court’s DCC jurisprudence dictates that state regulations that run afoul of the 
prohibition against direct regulation must be subjected to a “virtually per se 
rule of invalidity.”72 Such laws are “generally struck down . . . without further 
inquiry.”73 
In contrast, in 1970, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized in Pike v. Bruce 
Church, Inc. that laws that incidentally influence extraterritorial transactions 
must be subjected to a balancing test.74 In such cases, the Court stated, 
“[w]here [a state] statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate 
local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, 
it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly ex-
cessive in relation to the putative local benefits.”75 
This balancing test is necessary because the DCC’s anti-obstructionist func-
tion stands in tension with its sovereign-capacity function. “The prerogative of a 
[polity] to control and regulate activities within its boundaries is an essential, 
definitional element of sovereignty.”76 Thus, states generally retain the power to 
directly regulate transactions within their borders, even when such regulations 
incidentally affect interstate commerce.77 In contrast, states enjoy no inherent 
power to directly control out-of-state conduct78 by actually “punish[ing] [an ac-
tor] for conduct that was lawful [in the state] where it occurred.”79 
2. The Case Law 
The DCC’s extraterritoriality prohibition originated with the Supreme 
Court’s 1935 decision in Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc.,80 which averred that no 
state may “project its legislation into” another state.81 Although the Court ul-
                                                                                                                           
 72 Nw. Cent. Pipeline Corp. v. State Corp. Comm’n of Kan., 489 U.S. 493, 523 (1989) (quoting 
Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978)). 
 73 Brown-Forman, 476 U.S. at 579. The per se rule of invalidity also applies to protectionist stat-
utes. Id.  
 74 Pike, 397 U.S. at 137. 
 75 Id. at 142. 
 76 Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 921 (D.C. Cir. 1984); 
accord S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 767 (1945) (“[T]here is a residuum of power in the state 
to make laws governing [intrastate] matters . . . which nevertheless in some measure affect interstate 
commerce or even, to some extent, regulate it.”). 
 77 See Goldsmith & Sykes, supra note 42, at 796 (“[A]uto emissions are much more likely to 
cause dangerous concentrations of pollutants in the Los Angeles basin than on the open prairie. For 
such reasons, the benefits that a local citizenry derives from a particular regulation, and its willingness 
to bear the costs, will commonly differ across jurisdictions.”). 
 78 See Healy, 491 U.S. at 336 (stating that any “statute that directly controls commerce occurring 
wholly outside the boundaries of a State exceeds the inherent limits of the enacting State’s authority”). 
 79 BMW of N. Am., 517 U.S. at 572–73. 
 80 See Baldwin, 294 U.S. at 528. 
 81 Id. at 521. 
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timately struck down the statute at issue in that case as protectionist, the Court 
later adopted Baldwin’s extraterritoriality dicta in three 1980s opinions. 
a. Edgar v. MITE Corp.82 
In 1982 in Edgar v. MITE Corp.,83 the Court confronted an Illinois law 
that regulated hostile take-overs.84 The statute required that anyone making a 
takeover offer for shares of a “target company” notify Illinois’s Secretary of 
State and the company twenty days before the offer became effective.85 The 
law defined a “target company” as “a corporation . . . of which shareholders 
located in Illinois own 10% of the class of equity securities subject to the of-
fer,”86 or in the alternative, any corporation satisfying two of three conditions: 
“the corporation has its principal executive office in Illinois, is organized under 
the laws of Illinois, or has at least 10% of its stated capital and paid-in surplus 
represented within the State.”87 
In 1979, MITE made a tender offer to purchase all the shares of the Chi-
cago Rivet & Machine Co., a publicly held Illinois corporation.88 Rather than 
complying with Illinois’s anti-takeover law, MITE filed suit seeking to enjoin 
its enforcement.89 The Edgar Court struck down the statute.90 A four-justice 
plurality opinion penned by Justice White concluded that Illinois’s law offend-
ed the sovereignty of sister states.91 
The plurality concluded that the DCC prohibits attempts to regulate out-
of-state transactions.92 It “precludes the application of a state statute to com-
merce that takes place wholly outside of the State’s borders, whether or not the 
commerce has effects within the State.”93 Such regulation “‘exceed[s] the in-
herent limits of the State’s power.’”94 
                                                                                                                           
 82 The case discussions in this Subsection and the footnotes herein are drawn from and closely 
track the text of a prior Article. DeVeaux, supra note 56, at 1009–11. 
 83 Edgar, 457 U.S. at 624. 
 84 Id.  
 85 Id. at 626–27. 
 86 Id. at 627.  
 87 Id. 
 88 Id.  
 89 Id. at 628. 
 90 Id. at 646 (plurality opinion). 
 91 Id. at 643, 646. 
 92 Id. at 641–43. 
 93 Id. at 642–43. 
 94 Id. at 643 (quoting Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 197 (1977)). While the Court invalidated 
the anti-takeover law in Edgar, it took care to distinguish the statute from state laws governing the 
internal affairs of corporations created under the regulating state’s own law. The internal-affairs doc-
trine is “a conflict of laws principle which recognizes that only one State should have the authority to 
regulate a corporation’s internal affairs—matters peculiar to the relationships among or between the 
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b. Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Authority95 
In 1986, a majority of the Court adopted the Edgar plurality’s extraterrito-
riality rule in Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Author-
ity.96 There, the Court confronted New York’s Alcoholic Beverage Control 
Law (“ABC Law”), which required distributors to file a monthly price sched-
ule with the State Liquor Agency specifying the prices at which they would 
sell their products to wholesalers for that month.97 The law required distribu-
tors to affirm that those prices were “no higher than the lowest price the distill-
er [would] charge[] wholesalers anywhere else in the United States” for the 
month in which the affirmation was made.98 
The challenger, a Kentucky distiller,99 conceded that the statute regulated 
all distributors “evenhandedly” and that New York enacted it for a “legiti-
mate,” i.e. non-discriminatory purpose: “to assure the lowest possible prices 
for its residents.”100 Nonetheless, the Court found that the statute offended the 
DCC because it “effectively regulate[d] the price at which liquor [wa]s sold in 
other States” by “ma[king] it illegal for a distiller to reduce its price in other 
States during the period that [a] posted New York price [wa]s in effect.”101 
The Court applied the so-called “per se rule of invalidity,” meaning that 
state statutes regulating interstate commercial activity will “generally [be] 
                                                                                                                           
corporation and its current officers, directors, and shareholders—because otherwise a corporation 
could be faced with conflicting demands.” Id. at 645 (majority opinion). The Constitution entrusts the 
state of incorporation to enact laws governing such matters. Id. at 643. This is so because 
“[c]orporations . . . are creatures of state law,” and as such, the incorporating state’s law is the “font” 
of a corporation’s powers and governs its internal organization. Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 
500 U.S. 90, 98–99 (1991) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Burks v. 
Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 478 (1979)). The internal-affairs doctrine did not save Illinois’s anti-takeover 
law from MITE’s facial challenge because the law applied to corporations incorporated under the laws 
of other states. See Edgar, 457 U.S. at 645–46. “Illinois has no interest in regulating the internal af-
fairs of foreign corporations.” Id. Thus, the Court in Edgar invalidated the anti-takeover law because 
it directly regulated extraterritorial commerce in violation of the DCC. Id. In my view, Illinois’s anti-
takeover law could have withstood an as-applied challenge because the target company was an Illinois 
corporation. See id. at 627; see also CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 72–74, 79 
(1987) (upholding an Indiana statute that conditioned the “acquisition of control of a corporation . . . 
incorporated in Indiana . . . on approval of a majority of the pre-existing disinterested shareholders” 
because the law only applied to Indiana corporations which were “mere creature[s] of Indiana’s law”). 
 95 The case discussions in this Subsection and the footnotes herein are drawn from and closely 
track the text of a prior Article. DeVeaux, supra note 56, at 1011–13. 
 96 Brown-Forman, 476 U.S. at 582. 
 97 Id. at 575. 
 98 Id.  
 99 Wis. Dep’t of Revenue v. William Wrigley, Jr., Co., 505 U.S. 214, 221 (1992) (noting that 
Brown-Forman is based in Kentucky). 
 100 Brown-Forman, 476 U.S. at 579. 
 101 Id. at 579–80, 582. 
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struck down . . . without further inquiry.”102 The Court found that New York’s 
ABC law directly regulated out-of-state commerce.103 By “[f]orcing a [Ken-
tucky] merchant to seek [New York’s] regulatory approval” before it could 
transact business with consumers in Kentucky and other jurisdictions,104 “New 
York ha[d] ‘project[ed] its legislation’ into other States, and directly regulated 
commerce therein” in contravention of the DCC.105 For this reason, the Court 
invalidated the statute “without further inquiry.”106 
c. Healy v. Beer Institute, Inc.107 
The Court’s 1989 decision in Healy v. Beer Institute, Inc. involved anoth-
er price-affirmation statute.108 This time, Connecticut required beer makers “to 
affirm that their posted prices for products sold to Connecticut wholesalers 
[were] . . . no higher than the prices at which those products [were] sold in the 
bordering States of Massachusetts, New York, and Rhode Island.”109 
Connecticut’s law differed from New York’s ABC law in one respect: 
“[N]othing in [the Connecticut statute] prohibit[ed] out-of-state [brewers] from 
changing their out-of-state prices after the affirmed Connecticut price [wa]s 
posted.”110 Despite this difference, the Court found that the law directly regu-
lated extraterritorial commerce by “purposeful[ly] interact[ing] with border-
state regulatory schemes.”111 
As the Court explained, “Massachusetts requires brewers to post their 
prices on the first day of the month to become effective on the first day of the 
following month.”112 Nonetheless, “[f]ive days later . . . those same brewers, in 
order to sell beer in Connecticut, must affirm that their Connecticut prices for 
the following month will be no higher than the lowest price that they are charg-
ing in any border State.”113 Thus, as a result of the price-affirmation statute, 
“on January 1, when a brewer posts his February prices for Massachusetts, that 
                                                                                                                           
 102 Id. at 579. 
 103 Id. at 582. 
 104 Id. 
 105 Id. at 584 (alterations in original) (quoting Baldwin, 294 U.S. at 521). 
 106 Id. at 579. 
 107 The case discussions in this Subsection and the footnotes herein are drawn from and closely 
track the text of a prior Article. DeVeaux, supra note 56, at 1013–15. 
 108 See Healy, 491 U.S. at 326. 
 109 Id. 
 110 Id. at 329. 
 111 Id. at 330 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 112 Id. at 338.  
 113 Id.  
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brewer must take account of the price he hopes to charge in Connecticut during 
the month of March.”114 
The Connecticut statute’s interaction with Massachusetts’s law “locked 
[the brewer] into his Massachusetts price for the entire month of February,” 
thereby “prospectively preclud[ing] the alteration of out-of-state prices after 
the moment of affirmation.”115 The Court found that by “t[ying] pricing to the 
regulatory schemes of the border states . . . the Connecticut statute ha[d] the 
extraterritorial effect, condemned in Brown-Forman, of preventing brewers 
from undertaking competitive pricing in Massachusetts based on prevailing 
market conditions.”116 Because the statute ran afoul of the DCC’s prohibition 
against direct regulation of extraterritorial commerce, the Court struck it 
down.117 The Court concluded that this prohibition preserves “the autonomy of 
the individual States within their respective spheres.”118 
Reaffirming the extraterritoriality principles elucidated by the Edgar plu-
rality and adopted by Brown-Forman, the Healy Court offered a summary of 
the doctrine. “Taken together, our our cases concering the extraterritorial ef-
fects of state economic regulation state at a minimum” for two important prin-
ciples.119 “First, the [DCC] ‘precludes the application of a state statute to 
commerce that takes place wholly outside of the State’s borders, whether or 
not the commerce has effects within the State.’”120 Second, the DCC dictates 
that any “statute that directly controls commerce occurring wholly outside the 
boundaries of a state exceeds the inherent limits of the enacting State’s authori-
ty” and ordinarily must be stricken without further inquiry.121  
In 1996, the Court expanded upon these proscriptions in BMW of North 
America, Inc. v. Gore,122 citing Healy for the proposition “that a State may not 
impose economic sanctions on violators of its laws with the intent of changing 
[such actors’] lawful conduct in other States”;123 thus, a state may not “punish 
[an actor] for conduct that was lawful [in the state] where it occurred.”124 
The Healy Court also found that Connecticut’s statute contravened the 
DCC’s anti-discrimination prohibitions.125 Unlike New York’s ABC law, Con-
                                                                                                                           
 114 Id.  
 115 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 116 Id.  
 117 Id. at 339. 
 118 Id. at 335–36.  
 119 Id. at 336.  
 120 Id. (quoting Edgar, 457 U.S. at 642–43 (plurality opinion)). 
 121 Id. 
 122 BMW of N. Am., 517 U.S. at 560. 
 123 Id. at 571–72 (citing Healy, 491 U.S. at 335–36). 
 124 Id. at 572–73. 
 125 See Healy, 491 U.S. at 341.  
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necticut’s “statute applie[d] solely to interstate brewers or shippers of beer, that 
is, either Connecticut brewers who s[old] both in Connecticut and in at least 
one border State or out-of-state shippers who s[old] both in Connecticut and in 
at least one border State.”126 The Court concluded that Connecticut’s law “dis-
criminate[d] against interstate commerce”127 by “establish[ing] a substantial 
disincentive for companies doing business in Connecticut to engage in inter-
state commerce, essentially penalizing Connecticut brewers if they s[ought] 
border-state markets and out-of-state shippers if they cho[se] to sell both in 
Connecticut and in a border State.”128 
B. The Purported Demise of the DCC’s Extraterritoriality Doctrine 
From its inception, the DCC’s extraterritoriality doctrine has faced unre-
lenting academic attack.129 Critics charged that the doctrine is mere dicta,130 that 
it “is a relic of the old world with no useful role to play in the new,”131 and that it 
“inhibits state experimentation with laws that attempt to solve their social and 
economic problems.”132 Yet, despite these challenges, the lower federal courts 
dutifully adhered to Brown-Forman’s pronouncements for nearly three dec-
ades.133 But after the Sixth Circuit’s controversial 2012 decision in American 
Beverage Association v. Snyder cracks in this resolve began to develop. 
1. American Beverage Association v. Snyder 
American Beverage Association involved an amendment to Michigan’s 
“Bottle Deposit” law.134 The statute required consumers to pay a deposit on 
purchases of “returnable containers,” (bottles or cans) that will be refunded 
when used containers are redeemed at groceries and department stores.135 Al-
most from the start, Michigan noted an “over-redemption” problem—“the val-
                                                                                                                           
 126 Id. (emphasis omitted).  
 127 Id. at 340.  
 128 Id. at 341.  
 129 See supra note 42 and accompanying text (citing to authorities criticizing the DCC’s extrater-
ritoriality doctrine). 
 130 See infra notes 174–198 (providing an overview of the argument that the extraterritoriality 
doctrine is merely dicta, and then making the opposite argument). 
 131 Am. Beverage Ass’n, 700 F.3d at 812 (Sutton, J., concurring). 
 132 Recent Case, supra note 42, at 2442. 
 133 E.g., Am. Beverage Ass’n, 700 F.3d at 810; Carolina Trucks & Equip., Inc. v. Volvo Trucks of 
N. Am., Inc., 492 F.3d 484, 489–92 (4th Cir. 2007); Am. Booksellers Found. v. Dean, 342 F.3d 96, 
102–04 (2d Cir. 2003); Dean Foods Co. v. Brancel, 187 F.3d 609, 615–18, 620 (7th Cir. 1999); Mey-
er, 165 F.3d at 1153; Morley-Murphy Co. v. Zenith Elecs. Corp., 142 F.3d 373, 379–80 (7th Cir. 
1998); Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Miller, 10 F.3d 633, 638–40 (9th Cir. 1993); Hyde Park 
Partners, L.P. v. Connolly, 839 F.2d 837, 843–45 (1st Cir. 1988). 
 134 Am. Beverage Ass’n, 700 F.3d at 800. 
 135 Id. at 800–01. 
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ue of the deposits collected . . . was less than the total value of refunds 
paid.”136 This deficit results from what might be called a Kramer problem, in 
reference to a 1996 Seinfeld episode where the eponymous character drove a 
mail truck full of New York-sourced cans to Michigan for redemption.137 
Michigan recognized that such “unauthorized returns . . . reduce[] the revenue 
stream to the State because no deposit was paid to the State.”138 Such fraud 
results, on average, “in a loss of $15.6 to $30 million every year in Michigan 
deposits.”139 
In response, Michigan’s legislature enacted a law requiring bottlers to brand 
Michigan-sold containers with a mark that is “unique to the state.”140 The statute 
prohibited bottlers from selling containers bearing this “unique mark” in states 
that did not have a bottle deposit scheme similar to Michigan’s.141 
Bottlers challenged the statute, asserting that by prohibiting the sale of 
containers bearing Michigan’s mark in other states, the “unique-mark require-
ment” directly regulated extraterritorial commerce.142 Although the Michigan 
law was not protectionist in nature—“the same unique marking requirement 
applie[d] equally to in-state and out-of-state manufacturers”143—the court con-
cluded that the statute directly regulated out-of-state transactions in violation 
of Brown-Forman. The court noted that Michigan’s “unique-mark require-
ment” did more than simply require manufacturers to meet Michigan-specific 
requirements for containers sold in Michigan, which is permissible, but it also 
dictated where products bearing that mark could be sold.144 Thus, the Ameri-
can Beverage Association court concluded “that the Michigan statute [was] 
extraterritorial in violation of the [DCC] because it impermissibly regulate[d] 
interstate commerce by controlling conduct beyond the State of Michigan.”145 
                                                                                                                           
 136 Id. at 801. 
 137 See Ethan Wolff-Mann, This Guy Drove 10,000 Cans to Michigan (Like in Seinfeld) and Got 
Busted, TIME (July 25, 2016), http://time.com/money/4422277/seinfeld-bottle-deposit-real-michigan/ 
[https://perma.cc/A6JU-NSFH]; Meg Marco, Seinfeldian: Some Consumers Really Do Drive Their 
Cans and Bottles to Michigan, CONSUMERIST (Oct. 28, 2008), https://consumerist.com/2008/10/28/
seinfeldian-some-consumers-really-do-drive-their-cans-and-bottles-to-michigan/ [https://perma.cc/
Y7S8-FC2W]; Michigan’s Returnable Law Needs Tweaking, BLOGS MONROE (Dec. 4, 2008), https://
web.archive.org/web/20150925204424/http://www.blogsmonroe.com/world/2008/12/michigans-
returnable-law-needs-tweaking/ (coining the phrase “Kramer problem”).  
 138 Am. Beverage Ass’n, 700 F.3d at 801. 
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 140 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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 142 Id. at 802. 
 143 Id. at 805. 
 144 Id. at 810. 
 145 Id. 
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Judge Sutton expressed his angst with the court’s holding in a concurring 
opinion that reads more like a dissent.146 Contending that the extraterritoriality 
doctrine has become the DCC’s “dormant branch,”147 he argued that the doc-
trine “is a relic of the old world with no useful role to play in the new.”148 
Although I agree that Michigan’s label law violated the DCC by threaten-
ing to “punish [bottlers] for conduct that was lawful [in the state] where it oc-
curred,”149 I too find American Beverage Association’s resolution deeply un-
satisfying. Unlike the paternalistic laws stricken by the Court in Edgar, Brown-
Forman, and Healy—which intruded upon the sovereignty of sister states by 
directly controlling the material terms of transactions in those states—the label 
law evidenced no such paternalism. Yes, the statute “projected”150 Michigan’s 
law into Ohio by banning the sale of bottles bearing the Michigan mark in the 
Buckeye State.151 But unlike New York’s attempt to regulate the price of bour-
bon in Kentucky,152 it is unlikely that Ohio’s lawmakers or voters would regard 
Michigan’s regulation as an affront to their state’s sovereignty. But such benign 
extraterritorial regulations are rare. The exception, in short, does not disprove 
the rule.153 
2. Energy and Environment Legal Institute v. Epel 
In Energy and Environment Legal Institute v. Epel,154 the Tenth Circuit, 
per Justice Gorsuch, confronted a challenge to Colorado’s renewable-energy 
mandate.155 The law requires Colorado utilities to “ensure that 20% of the elec-
tricity they sell to Colorado consumers comes from renewable sources.”156 The 
                                                                                                                           
 146 See id. at 811 (Sutton, J., concurring). 
 147 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting IMS Health Inc., 616 F.3d at 29 n.27). 
 148 Id. at 812. 
 149 See BMW of N. Am., 517 U.S. at 572–73. 
 150 See Baldwin, 294 U.S. at 521. 
 151 See Am. Beverage Ass’n, 700 F.3d at 810. 
 152 See Brown-Forman, 476 U.S. at 584. 
 153 Michael Dorf argued that the DCC “operates as a kind of default principle” whereby “[t]he 
courts presume that Congress would preempt” paternalistic or discriminatory state laws if it possessed 
“the capacity to keep track of and override” all such laws. Michael C. Dorf, Is the Dormant Commerce 
Clause a “Judicial Fraud”?, VERDICT (May 20, 2015), https://verdict.justia.com/2015/05/20/is-the-
dormant-commerce-clause-a-judicial-fraud [https://perma.cc/5ZKL-APPA]. Dorf continued, “The fact 
that Congress has the power to override a judicial ruling finding a DCC violation acts as a failsafe in 
case the presumption fails.” Id. Michigan’s label law represents the exceptional case where a state 
“projected its legislation” into a neighbor without offending the latter’s sovereignty. See Baldwin, 294 
U.S. at 521. Rather than upend the DCC’s “default principle,” Congress should simply exercise its 
failsafe option by enacting a law authorizing Michigan to project its “unique-mark requirement” into 
other jurisdictions. 
 154 Epel, 793 F.3d at 1169. 
 155 Id. at 1170. 
 156 Id. 
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Energy and Environment Legal Institute (“EELI”), a trade group, brought suit 
challenging the law on behalf of out-of-state coal companies.157 EELI claimed 
that because the law “means some out-of-state coal producers . . . will lose 
business with out-of-state utilities who feed their power onto the [electrical] 
grid,”158 Colorado’s statute has “the practical effect of ‘control[ling] conduct 
beyond the boundaries of the State.’”159 EELI’s suit implicitly charged Colora-
do with regulating commercial transactions in Nebraska because Colorado, “a 
net importer of electricity,”160 imports a significant amount of electricity from 
coal-fired plants in Nebraska.161 
Because the Colorado mandate’s effects on out-of-state commerce are 
merely incidental, the law should not have triggered the extraterritorial doc-
trine in the first place.162 Yet, inexplicably the Epel court accepted EELI’s 
premise. Noting that Colorado’s mandate has “the effect of increasing demand 
for electricity generated using renewable sources” and “reduc[ing] demand for 
. . . electricity generated using fossil fuels,”163 Justice Gorsuch contended that 
the DCC’s extraterritoriality bar no longer inhibits a state’s ability to regulate 
transactions beyond its borders—at least when the statute “does not dictate the 
price of a product and does not ‘t[ie] the price of its in-state products to out-of-
state prices.’”164 
Labeling the extraterritoriality jurisprudence “the most dormant doctrine 
in [DCC] jurisprudence,”165 Justice Gorsuch asserted that the doctrine has died 
of atrophy, as the Supreme Court has not invoked it to invalidate a state law in 
more than a generation.166 Siding with critics of the doctrine—particularly 
Brannon Denning, who offered a purported “autopsy” of Brown-Forman in 
American Beverage Association’s aftermath167—Justice Gorsuch posited that 
the extraterritoriality doctrine has been reduced to “an application of the anti-
discrimination rule.”168 Pursuant to this reasoning, states may enforce non-
                                                                                                                           
 157 Id. at 1171. 
 158 Id.  
 159 Id. at 1174 (alteration in original) (quoting Appellants’ Opening Brief at 30, Epel, 793 F.3d 
1169 (2015) (No. 14-1216), 2014 WL 3795268, at *30). 
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protectionist laws that directly regulate extraterritorial conduct169 if that con-
duct “affects a substantial number of in-state residents”170—at least as long as 
“the burden imposed” on interstate commerce is not “clearly excessive in rela-
tion to the putative local benefits.”171 
C. Reports of the Extraterritoriality Doctrine’s Demise Stem from a 
Fundamental Misunderstanding of the Principle 
If one accepts Epel’s contention that the extraterritoriality doctrine has 
slipped this mortal coil, a fundamental question remains: What was the cause 
of death? The Supreme Court, after all, has never repudiated the doctrine. 
Lacking the corpus delicti172—“visible evidence” of the killing, e.g., “the dead 
body of a murdered person”173—the doctrine’s deniers usually point to two 
purportedly fatal blows. 
1. The Extraterritoriality Doctrine Is Not Dicta 
Brown-Forman recognizes that the DCC “precludes the application of a 
state statute to commerce that takes place wholly outside of the State’s borders, 
whether or not the commerce has effects within the State”174 Yet, despite the 
Court’s plain statements, extraterritoriality deniers have long contended that 
precedent only prohibits discriminatory laws—“regulatory measures designed 
                                                                                                                           
 169 Epel did suggest that laws that “dictate the price of a product” sold out-of-state or that “‘t[ie] 
the price of in-state products to out-of-state prices” still run afoul of the DCC. Id. at 1175 (citations 
omitted). But the court strongly implied that such statutes are protectionist. See id. at 1173. 
 170 IMS Health Inc., 616 F.3d at 44; accord Epel, 793 F.3d at 1170–73. 
 171 IMS Health Inc., 616 F.3d at 42 n.51 (quoting Pike, 397 U.S. at 142); accord Epel, 793 F.3d at 
1172. Epel stands in conflict with the Eighth Circuit’s 2016 decision in North Dakota v. Heydinger. 
825 F.3d 912, 912 (8th Cir. 2016). Heydinger addressed a challenge to Minnesota’s Next Generation 
Energy Act, which like Colorado’s renewable-energy mandate, limited the amount of electricity the 
state’s utilities could purchase from fossil-fuel-reliant generators. Id. at 913–14. In apparent conflict 
with Epel, the Heydinger panel struck down the Minnesota law in a divided opinion. See id. at 922. 
Averring that the Brown-Forman doctrine is still binding, Judge Loken concluded that Minnesota’s 
law directly regulated extraterritorial transactions in violation of the DCC. Id. at 921–22. Judge Mur-
phy agreed that Brown-Forman remains good law, but concluded that the statute “does not cover 
activity which occurs ‘wholly outside [of Minnesota].’” Id. at 926 (Murphy, J., concurring) (quoting 
Healy, 491 U.S. at 336). He nonetheless concluded that the statute is invalid because it conflicted with 
the Federal Power Act. Id. The third member of the panel, Judge Colloton, agreed with Judge Murphy 
that the Federal Power Act preempted Minnesota’s law, but offered no opinion regarding the statute’s 
compliance with the DCC. Id. at 927 (Colloton, J., concurring). 
 172 Latin for the “body of the crime,” the corpus delicti is defined as “[t]he fact of a transgres-
sion.” Corpus Delicti, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 173 Justin Miller, The Criminal Act, in LEGAL ESSAYS IN TRIBUTE TO ORRIN KIP MCMURRAY 
469, 478 (Max Radin & A.M. Kidd eds., 1935). 
 174 Healy, 491 U.S. at 336 (quoting Edgar, 457 U.S. at 642–43 (plurality opinion)); accord 
Brown-Forman, 476 U.S. at 579. 
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to benefit in-state economic interests by burdening out-of-state competi-
tors.”175 These commentators argue that the Court’s pronouncements that direct 
extraterritorial regulation “exceeds the inherent limits of [an] enacting State’s 
authority”176 constitute dictum. 
Mark Rosen was an early champion of this position, arguing that “all but 
one of the [three] Supreme Court cases that have struck down state regulations 
on the basis of extraterritoriality have concerned statutes that are readily char-
acterized as protectionist.”177 Moreover, the “singular exception,” Edgar v. 
MITE Corp., was offered by a mere plurality.178 Thus, he posits that the extra-
territoriality jurisprudence, in fact, “should be understood as applying only to 
protectionist state statutes.”179 Jack Goldsmith and Alan Sykes likewise dis-
miss the Court’s extraterritoriality jurisprudence as dicta.180 More recently, 
Brannon P. Denning has joined this chorus, arguing that Brown-Forman’s ex-
traterritoriality prohibitions are “a poor fit with the larger DCC [doctrine], 
which focuse[s] on . . . protectionism rather than whether a state law ‘directly’ 
regulate[s] interstate commerce.”181 
For more than two decades, the lower courts rejected these contentions, 
heeding the Supreme Court’s pronouncements.182 Nonetheless, in recent years 
jurists have begun to succumb to these arguments in dicta and dissent.183 
As I’ve stated before, assertions that the extraterritoriality doctrine is 
mere dicta baffle me.184 The Healy Court explicitly based its holding on two 
separate grounds, unambiguously striking the offending statute both because it 
discriminated against out-of-state commerce,185 and because it directly “regu-
lat[ed] commerce occurring wholly outside [the] State’s borders.”186 Extraterri-
toriality deniers’ oft-repeated argument that they can unilaterally ignore one of 
the Court’s dual bases ignores a fundamental tenet of our legal system: 
                                                                                                                           
 175 Limbach, 486 U.S. at 273. 
 176 Healy, 491 U.S. at 336. 
 177 Rosen, supra note 42, at 925; see also DeVeaux, supra note 56, at 1016. 
 178 Rosen, supra note 42, at 925; see also DeVeaux, supra note 56, at 1016. 
 179 Rosen, supra note 42, at 923; see also DeVeaux, supra note 56, at 1015. 
 180 Goldsmith & Sykes, supra note 42, at 806; see also DeVeaux, supra note 56, at 1016. 
 181 Denning, supra note 42, at 1007–08; see also DeVeaux, supra note 56, at 1016. 
 182 See supra note 133 and accompanying text (citing to several cases from federal courts adher-
ing to Brown-Forman). 
 183 E.g., Ass’n des Eleveurs, 729 F.3d at 951 (the extraterritoriality prohibition is limited to “price 
control or price affirmation statutes”) (quoting Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 
644, 669 (2003)); Am. Beverage Ass’n, 700 F.3d at 815 (Sutton, J., concurring) (“All told, I am not 
aware of a single Supreme Court dormant Commerce Clause holding that relied exclusively on the 
extraterritoriality doctrine to invalidate a state law.”). 
 184 DeVeaux, supra note 56, at 1016. 
 185 Healy, 491 U.S. at 340; DeVeaux, supra note 56, at 1016. 
 186 Healy, 491 U.S. at 332; DeVeaux, supra note 56, at 1016. 
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“[W]here a decision rests on two or more grounds, none can be relegated to the 
category of obiter dictum.”187 
The deniers’ dismissal of Brown-Forman is even more puzzling. There, 
the statute’s challenger, Brown-Forman Distillers, conceded on the record that 
New York’s price-affirmation statute was not discriminatory, acknowledging 
that it regulated all distillers “evenhandedly” and was enacted for a “legiti-
mate”—non-discriminatory purpose—“to assure the lowest possible prices for 
its residents.”188 Admittedly, Brown-Forman’s decision to concede the statute’s 
neutrality is a questionable one. A New York law barring liquor vendors from 
selling their wares in other states at lower prices than they charge in New York 
inherently discriminates against out-of-state distillers. New York’s cost of liv-
ing far exceeds the national average.189 Forcing a business to sell its goods to 
Kentucky consumers at New York prices is transactional suicide.190 The statute 
thus discouraged distillers based in other states from selling their goods in 
New York, creating an advantage for local distillers who did not do business in 
other parts of the country. 
In apparent recognition of this fact, Judge Sutton asserted in his American 
Beverage Association concurrence that “[a]ll told,” he is “not aware of a single 
Supreme Court [DCC] holding that relied exclusively on the extraterritoriality 
doctrine to invalidate a state law.”191 But this normative analysis ignores yet 
another fundamental tenet of the American legal system: Brown-Forman’s 
concession that New York’s law regulated all distillers “evenhandedly” is bind-
ing.192 The Supreme Court has “long recognized” that litigants may rely on the 
assumption that the facts as stipulated in the record are established.193 This ax-
iom “is the bookend to a party’s undertaking to be bound by the factual stipula-
tions it submits.”194 Thus, it is evident that Brown-Forman’s edict cannot rest 
on the alleged discriminatory nature of the statute. The Supreme Court was 
                                                                                                                           
 187 Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535, 537 (1949); DeVeaux, supra note 56, at 1016. 
 188 Brown-Forman, 476 U.S. at 579; see DeVeaux, supra note 56, at 1016–17. 
 189 See Cost of living in New York City, United States, EXPATISTAN, https://www.expatistan.com/
cost-of-living/new-york-city [https://perma.cc/23Q7-GWQV] (last visited Apr. 4, 2017) (showing that 
New York’s cost of living is the highest in the U.S. and third highest in the world). 
 190 See id. 
 191 Am. Beverage Ass’n, 700 F.3d at 815 (Sutton, J., concurring). 
 192 See Brown-Forman, 476 U.S. at 579. 
 193 Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of the Univ. of Cal. v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2983 (2010). 
The sole exception to this rule applies to stipulated facts that are essential to establishing a federal 
court’s subject-matter jurisdiction to adjudicate a case. See Jessica Berch, Waving Goodbye to Non-
Waivability: The Case for Permitting Waiver of Statutory Subject-Matter Jurisdiction Defects, 45 
MCGEORGE L. REV. 635, 639 (2014). 
 194 Christian Legal Soc’y, 130 S. Ct. at 2983. 
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obliged to accept Brown-Forman’s concession that New York’s law regulated 
“evenhandedly.”195 
More importantly, the Orwellian revisionism suggested by extraterritorial-
ity deniers ignores an even more critical facet of our stare-decisis-driven sys-
tem. As Judge Friendly observed when he addressed Erie deniers’ unrelenting 
arguments that the decision’s federalism contentions likewise were mere dicta, 
“[a] court’s stated and, on its view, necessary basis for deciding does not be-
come dictum because a critic would have decided on another basis.”196 It is 
inexplicable to me how so many respected scholars and jurists have ignored 
this tenet. The Brown-Forman Court regarded its finding that the offending 
statute “directly regulated interstate commerce”197 as “a necessary basis for 
deciding” the case.198 
2. Recent Decisions Rejecting Attempts to Invoke the Extraterritoriality 
Doctrine Involved Purely Intrastate Regulations 
Justice Gorsuch castigated the extraterritoriality principle as “the most 
dormant doctrine in the [DCC] jurisprudence.”199 Noting that nearly three dec-
ades have passed since the U.S. Supreme Court last invoked it to invalidate a 
state law, Judge Sutton argued in his American Beverage Association concur-
rence that “the extraterritoriality doctrine has been lost to time”; that it “is a 
relic of the old world with no useful role to play in the new.”200 A Harvard Law 
Review case comment contends that the “doctrine no longer furthers the 
[DCC’s] purpose.”201 Professor Denning agrees, asserting that the doctrine fell 
victim to constitutional “calcification.”202 He offered a purported eulogy, posit-
ing “that extraterritoriality . . . is dead, and unlikely to be revived by the cur-
rent Court.”203 Justice Gorsuch relied in large measure on this “post-mortem” 
analysis, concluding in Epel that the DCC’s extraterritoriality doctrine is, in-
deed, dead.204 
Although these arguments possess some rhetorical appeal, they ignore the 
doctrine of stare decisis. “[O]ur legal system has no sunset provision for prec-
                                                                                                                           
 195 See Brown-Forman, 476 U.S. at 579. 
 196 Henry J. Friendly, In Praise of Erie—and of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 383, 385–86 (1964); see DeVeaux, supra note 56, at 1017–18. 
 197 Brown-Forman, 476 U.S. at 578. 
 198 See Friendly, supra note 196, at 385–86. 
 199 Epel, 793 F.3d at 1170. 
 200 Am. Beverage Ass’n, 700 F.3d at 812 (Sutton, J., concurring). 
 201 Recent Case, supra note 42, at 2438. 
 202 Denning, supra note 42, at 995. 
 203 Id. at 979–80. 
 204 Epel, 793 F.3d at 1175 (citing Denning, supra note 42, at 998–99). 
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edents.”205 Our courts “use decades-old and centuries-old precedents to 
achieve consistency over time.”206 
More importantly, upon closer examination, most critiques of the Su-
preme Court’s extraterritoriality jurisprudence reveal a complete misapprehen-
sion of the doctrine. They conflate the DCC’s anti-obstructionist function, 
which limits state authority to regulate purely intrastate conduct by imposing 
regulations that induce regulated actors to alter their out-of-state conduct, with 
its sovereign-capacity function, which bars states from directly regulating ex-
traterritorial conduct. 
Many purely intrastate regulations incidentally affect extraterritorial 
commerce. Every state law requiring a manufacturer to label a product to in-
form consumers of a known hazard will incidentally alter labels in neighboring 
jurisdictions; manufacturers will wish to avoid the expense of separately label-
ing products bound for a particular state. A blanket prohibition on such laws 
would offend state sovereignty.207 Thus, a law’s extraterritorial effects will on-
ly presumptively condemn it on the rare occasion when it aims to actually 
“punish [actors] for conduct that was lawful [in the state] where it oc-
curred.”208 
For example, the Brown-Forman Court ruled New York’s ABC law per se 
unconstitutional because it directly regulated liquor sales in other states—it 
prohibited Brown-Forman from lowering its prices in Kentucky without ap-
proval from the New York State Liquor Authority.209 New York directly ap-
plied its laws to transactions in other states.210 
Conversely, in the 1945 case Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, the Su-
preme Court did not apply the per se rule of invalidity to an Arizona law limit-
ing freight trains to seventy cars.211 Although the statute incidentally affected 
extraterritorial conduct—inducing railroads to shorten Arizona-bound trains to 
seventy cars to avoid breaking them up at the Arizona state line212—it did not 
                                                                                                                           
 205 Exxon Valdez v. Exxon Mobil, 568 F.3d 1077, 1089 (9th Cir. 2009) (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting); 
accord Kimble v. Marvel. Entm’t, LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2401, 2409 (2015) (“Respecting stare decisis 
means sticking to some wrong decisions.”); Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 
(1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“Stare decisis is usually the wise policy, because in most matters it 
is more important that the applicable rule of law be settled than that it be settled right.”). 
 206 Exxon Valdez, 568 F.3d at 1089 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting). 
 207 See SPGGC, LLC v. Blumenthal, 505 F.3d 183, 196 (2d Cir. 2007) (“Consumer protection 
matters are typically left to the control of the states precisely so that different states can apply different 
regulatory standards based on what is locally appropriate.”) (emphasis omitted). 
 208 BMW of N. Am., 517 U.S. at 572–73. 
 209 Brown-Forman, 476 U.S. at 583. 
 210 Id. at 584. 
 211 S. Pac. Co., 325 U.S. at 763, 765. 
 212 Id. at 773. 
976 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 58:953 
directly regulate extraterritorial conduct.213 The law did not “punish [railroads] 
for conduct that was lawful [in the state] where it occurred.”214 Railroads could 
operate trains exceeding seventy cars in neighboring states without fear of 
prosecution by Arizona authorities.215 Brown-Forman did not have that luxury. 
Selling bourbon in Kentucky at prices New York disapproved of would invite 
prosecution in New York.216 
Statutes of the sort confronted by the Southern Pacific Court are subject 
to the deferential Pike test. They “will be upheld unless the burden imposed on 
[interstate] commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local bene-
fits.”217 In contrast, laws that directly regulate out-of-state conduct—as in 
Brown-Forman—are unconstitutional virtually per se.218 
Blatant state paternalism of the sort confronted in Brown-Forman is quite 
rare.219 Thus, the Supreme Court has had few occasions to evaluate such laws. 
This has not stopped trade groups—eager to evade burdensome regulations—
from bringing suits casting purely intrastate laws as impermissible extraterrito-
rial regulation.220 
For example, in the Ninth Circuit’s 2013 opinion in Association des Elev-
eurs de Canards et d’Oies du Quebec v. Harris,221 a poultry trade association-
challenged a California law banning the sale of foie gras, a so-called “delicacy 
made from fattened duck liver.”222 Foie gras is produced by “force feeding 
birds to enlarge their livers beyond normal size.”223 The plaintiffs contended 
that the statute “control[led] commerce outside of California.”224 The Ninth 
Circuit rejected this claim, correctly observing that a statute is not subject to 
Brown-Forman’s per se rule of invalidity “merely because it affects in some 
way the flow of commerce between the States.”225 Rather, a statute is only un-
                                                                                                                           
 213 Id. at 773–75.  
 214 See BMW of N. Am., 517 U.S. at 572–73. 
 215 S. Pac. Co., 325 U.S. at 773. 
 216 See Brown-Forman, 476 U.S. at 583–84. 
 217 Pike, 397 U.S. at 142. 
 218 Brown-Forman, 476 U.S. at 579. 
 219 But see DeVeaux, supra note 56, at 996–1001 (arguing that certification of nation-wide class 
actions under a single state’s law constitutes direct extraterritorial regulation in violation of DCC).  
 220 E.g., Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070, 1104 (9th Cir. 2013); Ass’n 
des Eleveurs, 729 F.3d at 948–49; Pac. Merch. Shipping Ass’n v. Goldstene, 639 F.3d 1154, 1179 
(9th Cir. 2011); Int’l Dairy Foods Ass’n v. Boggs, 622 F.3d 628, 643–44 (6th Cir. 2010); IMS Health 
Inc., 616 F.3d at 29. 
 221 Ass’n des Eleveurs, 729 F.3d at 937. 
 222 Id. at 941–42. 
 223 Id. 
 224 Id. at 949. 
 225 Id. at 948–49 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Nat’l Ass’n of Optometrists & Opti-
cians v. Harris, 682 F.3d 1144, 1149 (9th Cir. 2012)). 
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constitutional “per se when it directly regulates interstate commerce”226—that 
is when it seeks “to punish [an actor] for conduct that was lawful where it oc-
curred.”227 Applying this principle, the court upheld California’s ban, conclud-
ing that it did not directly regulate out-of-state poultry producers; it merely 
dictated that certain products could not be sold in California.228 The statute’s 
effects on extraterritorial conduct were merely incidental. An Oregon farmer 
faced no liability for force-feeding ducks in Oregon; only for selling foie gras 
in California.229 Most courts have seen past efforts by trade groups to exploit 
the extraterritoriality doctrine to evade legitimate intrastate regulations.230 
But many in the academic community—and a few jurists, including Jus-
tice Gorsuch—have fallen prey to this misdirection, viewing judicial rejection 
of such misguided arguments as evidence that the prohibition against direct 
extraterritorial regulation is dead.231 Judge Sutton is another such victim. In his 
American Beverage Association concurrence, he observed that “[t]he modern 
reality is that the States frequently regulate activities that occur entirely within 
one State but that have effects in many.”232 As an example, he observed that 
Vermont’s regulation that light bulbs sold in the state include labels that warn 
against the negative affects of mercury leads light-bulb makers to put such la-
bels on bulbs sold in other states to avoid the cost of separately labeling their 
Vermont-bound bulbs.233 
Other critics have echoed these observations. Professor Denning contends 
that lower court opinions “reject[ing] extraterritoriality arguments brought by 
manufacturers whose products must be labeled in a particular way before being 
sold in a state, even if compliance with the state law would require changes in 
their out-of-state manufacturing processes” confirm the extraterritoriality doc-
trine’s demise.234 Likewise, a Harvard Law Review case comment pointed out 
that since Brown-Forman and Healy, “the Supreme Court has . . . upheld many 
state regulations that significantly affect interstate commerce.”235 
Fair enough. But these arguments make the all-too-common mistake of 
confusing the DCC’s sovereign-capacity function with its anti-obstructionist 
                                                                                                                           
 226 Id. at 949 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Miller, 10 F.3d at 638). 
 227 See BMW of N. Am., 517 U.S. at 572–73. 
 228 Ass’n des Eleveurs, 729 F.3d at 948–49. 
 229 See id. A recent District Court ruling concluded that Congress has preempted California’s 
foie-gras ban. Ass’n des Eleveurs de Canards et d’Oies du Quebec v. Harris, 79 F. Supp. 3d 1136, 
1147–48 (C.D. Cal. 2015). 
 230 See supra note 220 and accompanying text (providing examples of courts refusing to extend 
the extraterritoriality doctrine). 
 231 See infra note 243 and accompanying text. 
 232 Am. Beverage Ass’n, 700 F.3d at 812 (Sutton, J., concurring) (emphasis added). 
 233 Id. at 813. 
 234 Denning, supra note 42, at 993 (emphasis added). 
 235 Recent Case, supra note 42, at 2438–39. 
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function.236 For example, Professors Goldsmith and Sykes—condemning the 
extraterritoriality doctrine—noted that “regulatory uniformity is often undesir-
able” because a state’s “[p]revailing attitudes . . . may depend on the religious 
and cultural backgrounds of the local citizenry” and “geographic factors may 
directly affect the value of regulation.”237 I agree. 
The extraterritorially doctrine protects regional variation. As the Second 
Circuit noted, “Consumer protection matters are typically left to the control of 
the states precisely so that different states can apply different regulatory stand-
ards based on what is locally appropriate.”238 Thus, states are allowed wide 
latitude to regulate intrastate activities, notwithstanding incidental extraterrito-
rially effects.239 But allowing a “state [to] reach[] into another state’s affairs” 
inhibits such variation.240 Empowering Nebraska to directly regulate Colorado 
transactions allows Nebraska’s polity to substitute Colorado’s “[p]revailing 
attitudes” with its own.241 
For this reason, Brown-Forman’s per se rule of invalidity prohibits state 
laws that directly regulate out-of-state transactions. In contrast, intrastate laws 
that incidentally affect interstate commerce by inducing regulated parties to 
alter their out-of-state conduct are subject to Pike’s deferential balancing test. 
The Court’s opinion in the 2003 case Pharmaceutical Research and Man-
ufacturers of America v. Walsh242—the decision most frequently cited as proof 
of the Supreme Court’s abandonment of the extraterritoriality doctrine243—
demonstrates this critical distinction. Walsh confronted a Maine law that pro-
vides discounted prescription drugs to the state’s citizens.244 Pursuant to the 
statute, the state assumes the role of “pharmacy benefit manager”245 to negoti-
                                                                                                                           
 236 See supra notes 56–79 (discussing the distinct constitutional functions served by the DCC). 
 237 Goldsmith & Sykes, supra note 42, at 796; see also DeVeaux, supra note 56, at 1021.  
 238 SPGGC, LLC, 505 F.3d at 196 (emphasis omitted); accord BMW of N. Am., 517 U.S. at 570 
(noting that the states have enacted “a patchwork of [consumer-protection laws] representing the di-
verse policy judgments of lawmakers in [all] 50 States”); see also DeVeaux, supra note 56, at 1021.  
 239 BMW of N. Am., 517 U.S.at 569–70 (“[A] State may protect its citizens by prohibiting decep-
tive trade practices”); see also DeVeaux, supra note 56, at 1021.  
 240 See Carolina Trucks & Equip., Inc., 492 F.3d at 490. 
 241 See Goldsmith & Sykes, supra note 42, at 796. 
 242 Walsh, 538 U.S. at 644. 
 243 See e.g., Epel, 793 F.3d at 1174–75; Ass’n des Eleveurs, 729 F.3d at 951; Am. Bev. Ass’n, 700 
F.3d at 810–11 (Sutton, J., concurring); Denning, supra note 42, at 90–94; Brannon P. Denning, The 
Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine: Prolegomenon to a Defense, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1801, 1811 
(2004); Scott Fruehwald, The Rehnquist Court and Horizontal Federalism: An Evaluation and a Pro-
posal for Moderate Constitutional Constraints on Horizontal Federalism, 81 DENV. U. L. REV. 289, 
324–25 (2003). 
 244 Walsh, 538 U.S. at 649. 
 245 Id. at 654. 
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ate rebates with pharmaceutical companies to fund reduced prices for medica-
tions purchased by eligible Mainers.246 
Out-of-state drug manufacturers challenged the statute, arguing that by 
requiring them to make rebate payments for Maine-bound drugs, the statute 
controls the terms of their contracts with wholesalers outside of Maine.247 The 
drug makers argued that the law “change[d] the economic terms of [such out-
of-state] transactions” by inducing them to charge higher prices to avoid suf-
fering a reduction in “the price” they receive in their “out-of-state wholesale 
sales of drugs that ultimately cross pharmacy counters in Maine.”248 
The Court rejected these arguments, concluding that the law, at most, in-
duces drug makers to make rebate payments to Maine authorities for drugs 
actually sold to consumers in Maine.249 The statute does not directly regulate 
the terms of contracts between pharmaceutical companies and wholesalers—in 
Maine or elsewhere.250 Unlike the statutes struck down in Healy and Brown-
Forman—which subjected vendors to penalties for selling their wares to con-
sumers in other jurisdictions without the approval of the regulating state—the 
effect of Maine’s law on out-of-state pharmaceutical sales to wholesalers is 
merely incidental.251 Because the drug makers know that they must make re-
bate payments for Maine-bound drugs, they charge wholesalers higher prices 
to defray some of the cost.252 
For this reason, the Walsh Court concluded that the law did not run afoul 
of the extraterritoriality doctrine. Unlike the statutes tackled by Brown-Forman 
and Healy, “the Maine Act does not regulate the price of any out-of-state 
transaction, either by its express terms or by its inevitable effect.”253 Nor does 
Maine “insist that manufacturers sell their drugs to a wholesaler for a certain 
price.”254 
Accordingly, the Maine law does not directly regulate activities beyond 
the state’s borders; rather, it “only has incidental effects on interstate com-
merce.”255 Because the First Circuit concluded that the burdens that the statute 
                                                                                                                           
 246 Id. at 649. 
 247 Brief for Petitioners at 28, Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Concannon, 538 U.S. 644 
(2003) (No. 01-188), 2002 WL 31120844, at *28. 
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 250 Id. (quoting Concannon, 249 F.3d at 81–82). 
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imposed on interstate commerce were not “clearly excessive in relation to the 
putative local benefits,”256 a finding that the Supreme Court did not review,257 
the Walsh majority affirmed the statute’s constitutionality.258 
Remarkably, Professor Denning and other scholars assert that Walsh 
demonstrates that the Court has “retreated” from Healy and Brown-Forman, 
leaving “the extraterritoriality principle look[ing] . . . quite moribund.”259 In a 
similar vein, the Ninth Circuit contended, in dicta, that by simply observing 
that “Healy and Baldwin [v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc.] involved ‘price control or price 
affirmation statutes,’” the Walsh Court limited the extraterritoriality doctrine to 
such statutes.260 
Walsh did no such thing. The Court has similarly observed that “Marbury 
v. Madison was a recognition of the power of Congress over the term of office 
of a justice of the peace for the District of Columbia.”261 By the logic of the 
Ninth Circuit, this means that Marbury’s broader pronouncement that it is “the 
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is”262 should 
now be limited to cases involving attempts to interfere with Congress’s control 
“over the term of office of a justice of the peace for the District of Colum-
bia.”263 Nonsense. Walsh merely reached the unremarkable conclusion that 
statutes that regulate intrastate activity are not per se unconstitutional merely 
because they incidentally affect interstate transactions. This enables states to 
“try novel social and economic experiments” within their own borders, but 
prohibits them from conscripting the citizens or property of neighboring states 
as guinea pigs in their experiments.264 
Yet, the Epel court, relying on Professor Denning’s flawed reading, con-
cluded that Walsh repudiated the DCC’s extraterritoriality doctrine.265 Worse, 
the court failed to recognize that Colorado’s renewable-energy mandate does 
                                                                                                                           
 256 Concannon, 249 F.3d at 83 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Pike, 397 U.S. at 142). 
 257 With regard to the DCC, the Walsh petitioner confined its petition for review to the question 
whether “requiring an out-of-state manufacturer, which sells its products to wholesalers outside the 
state, to pay the state each time one of its products is subsequently sold by a retailer within the state” 
ran afoul of the extraterritoriality doctrine. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i, Pharm. Research & 
Mfrs. of Am. v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644 (2003) (No. 01-188), 2001 WL 34133506. The petitioner did not 
petition the Court to review the First Circuit’s finding that Maine’s regulation satisfied the Pike test. 
Id. 
 258 Walsh, 538 U.S. at 669–70. 
 259 Denning, supra note 42, at 979. 
 260 Ass’n des Eleveurs, 729 F.3d at 951 (citing Walsh, 538 U.S. at 669). 
 261 Parsons v. United States, 167 U.S. 324, 337 (1897). 
 262 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). 
 263 See Parsons, 167 U.S. at 337. 
 264 See Liebmann, 285 U.S. at 311 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
 265 Epel, 793 F.3d at 1174–75 (citing Denning, supra note 42, at 998–99; Goldsmith & Sykes, 
supra note 42, at 806). 
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not directly regulate out-of-state conduct. The Colorado mandate’s effects on 
electricity generators in Nebraska and other states are merely incidental. 
Colorado’s statute directs the state’s utilities “to ensure that 20% of the 
electricity they sell to Colorado consumers comes from renewable sources.”266 
Noting that “Colorado is a net importer of electricity,” the Epel plaintiffs as-
serted that the law constitutes impermissible extraterritorial regulation because 
“some out-of-state coal producers . . . will lose business” to more environmen-
tally friendly producers.267 Accepting the plaintiffs’ assertions for purposes of 
argument that Colorado’s regulation constitutes direct regulation of extraterri-
toriality commerce,268 the court posited that the DCC’s prohibition against 
such regulation is no longer binding.269 
But in reaching this conclusion the Epel court completely failed to recog-
nize that the statute in question does not directly regulate extraterritorial com-
merce.270 It only regulates intrastate electrical utilities—placing limits on the 
power they may sell to Colorado consumers in Colorado. To be sure, Colora-
do’s cap on coal-fired electricity will affect out-of-state commerce. By direct-
ing its utilities to purchase twenty percent of the state’s power from renewable-
energy producers, Colorado’s mandate will increase the demand for carbon-
friendly power and reduce the demand for electricity produced by burning 
coal. Thus, as the court noted, “fossil fuel producers like [the plaintiff’s] mem-
ber[s] will be hurt.”271 But these effects on interstate commerce are merely in-
cidental—and likely permissible under Pike.272 
Colorado’s law does not seek to “punish [Nebraska power producers] for 
conduct that was lawful where it occurred.”273 Such producers remain free to 
generate coal-fired power to the limits prescribed by local (and federal) law 
and to sell that power to willing buyers. Colorado has merely imposed man-
dates on its own utilities purchased for consumption by Colorado consumers. 
Colorado’s law may affect coal prices in other states by reducing the demand 
for coal-fired electricity in Colorado.274 But like the statute in Walsh Colora-
do’s mandate does not directly regulate “any out-of-state transaction, either by 
                                                                                                                           
 266 Id. at 1170 (emphasis added). 
 267 Id. at 1171. 
 268 See id. at 1173–75. 
 269 Id. at 1174–75. 
 270 See supra note 38 and accompanying text (discussing Epel). 
 271 Epel, 793 F.3d at 1174. 
 272 In North Dakota v. Heydinger, Judge Loken fell prey to the Epel plaintiffs’ misguided argu-
ment. See Heydinger, 825 F.3d at 920; supra note 171 and accompanying text (discussing Heydinger). 
 273 See BMW of N. Am., 517 U.S. at 572–73. 
 274 Epel, 793 F.3d at 1171 (noting that Colorado’s law will cause “some out-of-state coal produc-
ers” to “lose business with out-of-state utilities who feed their power onto the grid”). 
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its express terms or by its inevitable effect.”275 Epel rightly concluded that the 
law is constitutional276—but for the wrong reason. 
Abandonment of the DCC’s prohibition against direct extraterritorial reg-
ulation will not facilitate “state experimentation with laws that attempt to solve 
their social and economic problems,” as critics contend.277 To the contrary, in-
vesting states with such power would bring a swift end to Brandeisian experi-
mentation. “[R]egulatory uniformity is often undesirable” because a state’s 
“[p]revailing attitudes . . . may depend on the religious and cultural back-
grounds of the local citizenry” and “geographic factors may directly affect the 
value of regulation.”278 Placing territorial limits on Nebraska’s regulatory au-
thority enables Colorado to experiment by decriminalizing marijuana. It pre-
vents Nebraska’s lawmakers from replacing Colorado’s “[p]revailing attitudes” 
about “the value of [marijuana] regulation” with their own.279 
II. INTERSTATE MARIJUANA CONFLICTS DEMONSTRATE THE NEED FOR A 
VIBRANT EXTRATERRITORIALITY DOCTRINE 
Epel, purported to permit Colorado to directly regulate Nebraska utility 
transactions. Colorado’s perceived intervention in Nebraska’s internal affairs 
may trigger retaliation. Section A examines some of Epel’s potential implica-
tions.280 Section B discusses the Pike test.281 Section C applies the Pike test to 
laws that attempt to regulate out-of-state marijuana transactions.282 
A. If Epel Stands, What Standards Govern a State’s Authority to Project Its 
Laws into Other Jurisdictions? 
If the extraterritoriality doctrine is, indeed, dead,283 what limits remain to 
cabin a state’s power to regulate extraterritorial conduct? Epel recognized, as 
explained in the previous Part,284 that since Brown-Forman, DCC “cases are 
                                                                                                                           
 275 See Walsh, 538 U.S. at 669. 
 276 In my view, Colorado’s mandate easily satisfies the Pike balancing test. See infra notes 291–
326 and accompanying text. 
 277 See Recent Case, supra note 42, at 2442. 
 278 Goldsmith & Sykes, supra note 42, at 796. 
 279 See id. 
 280 See infra notes 283–290 and accompanying text.  
 281 See infra notes 291–326 and accompanying text.  
 282 See infra notes 327–365 and accompanying text.  
 283 The Supreme Court will likely revisit the DCC’s extraterritoriality doctrine in the near future 
because Epel is in conflict with rulings in other circuits. Compare North Dakota v. Heydinger, 825 
F.3d 912, 922 (8th Cir. 2016) (holding that the extraterritoriality doctrine is still valid), with Energy & 
Env’t Legal Inst. v. Epel, 793 F.3d 1169, 1174–75 (10th Cir. 2015) (declaring the extraterritoriality 
doctrine obsolete). 
 284 See supra notes 56–79 and accompanying text. 
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said to come in three varieties.”285 The first species consists of protectionist 
laws—“[l]aws that clearly discriminate against out-of-staters.”286 The second 
line targets “laws that [directly] control extraterritorial conduct.”287 The third 
variety of cases, the Pike line, scrutinizes “state laws burdening interstate 
commerce” that produce “insufficient offsetting local benefits” to justify those 
burdens.288 Justice Gorsuch was dismissive of the Pike doctrine, calling it “a 
pretty grand, even ‘ineffable,’ all-things-considered sort of test” that requires 
“judges (to attempt) to compare wholly incommensurable goods for wholly 
different populations”—“measuring the burdens on out-of-staters against the 
benefits to in-staters.”289 Yet ultimately while Epel abandoned the extraterrito-
riality doctrine, it left both Pike and the DCC’s anti-protectionist prohibitions 
unmolested.290 
The DCC’s protectionism ban would not restrain a prohibitionist state’s 
regulation of marijuana transactions in a pot-friendly neighbor. Such regulation 
would not advantage in-state pot sellers over out-of-state competitors. The 
prohibitionist state’s aim is to evenhandedly thwart in-state and out-of-state pot 
sellers alike. Nonetheless, the Pike test would impose some limits on such reg-
ulation. 
B. The Pike Test 
Pike’s modern balancing test, though “lack[ing] in precision,”291 puts a 
heavy thumb on the regulating state’s side of the scale.292 It recognizes that 
states enjoy a “wide scope” of authority concerning the regulation of intrastate 
matters even when regulations may impact interstate commerce.293 In particu-
lar, cases “where local safety measures” are found to “place an unconstitution-
al burden on interstate commerce” will be “few in number.”294 Thus, as Judge 
Posner has observed, a litigant seeking to invalidate a law under Pike “has a 
steep hill to climb.”295 
                                                                                                                           
 285 Epel, 793 F.3d at 1171. 
 286 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) 
 287 Id. at 1172 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 288 Id. at 1171 (citing Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 137 (1970)). 
 289 Id. 
 290 See id. at 1171, 1177. 
 291 Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373, 377 (1946). 
 292 See Pike, 397 U.S. at 142; Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520, 529 (1959); S. 
Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 763, 770 (1945). 
 293 S. Pac. Co., 325 U.S. at 770. 
 294 Bibb, 359 U.S. at 529. 
 295 Midwest Title Loans, Inc. v. Mills, 593 F.3d 660, 665 (7th Cir. 2010). 
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Since Lochner’s repudiation, 296 the Supreme Court has only struck down 
four laws under this doctrine. In three of these cases, the putative local interest 
served by the offending law proved to be of “dubious advantage.”297 In the 
fourth—Pike itself—the law’s putative benefit was “tenuous” at best.298 
In its 1946 opinion in Morgan v. Virginia,299 the Court confronted a Vir-
ginia statute that required buses “both interstate and intrastate, to separate” 
white passengers from persons of color “so that contiguous seats [would] not 
be occupied by persons of different races at the same time.”300 The Court as-
sessed the conviction of Irene Morgan,301 a forgotten heroine of the Civil-
Rights movement; an African-American passenger who refused to cede her 
seat when her bus reached the Virginia line.302 Applying the balancing test later 
articulated by Pike, the Morgan Court struck down the Virginia statute—and 
voided Mrs. Morgan’s conviction—finding that the law “impose[d] undue bur-
dens on interstate commerce.”303 
Virginia attested that its putative local interest was “to avoid friction be-
tween the races.”304 The Court deferentially accepted this assertion at face val-
ue, but found it deserved no real weight in the balancing process because 
“[s]uch regulation hampers freedom of choice in selecting accommoda-
tions.”305 Twenty-one years later, striking down Virginia’s anti-miscegenation 
law in Loving v. Virginia in 1967,306 the Court more honestly laid bare the true 
purpose underlying such racial classifications, recognizing that they are “obvi-
ously an endorsement of the doctrine of White Supremacy.”307 Loving also 
made explicit what Morgan merely implied: “There is patently no legiti-
mate . . . purpose” justifying such “invidious racial discrimination.”308 
Noting that “no state law can reach beyond its own border,” a proposition 
challenged by Epel and its supporters, the Morgan Court concluded that racial-
                                                                                                                           
 296 See Lochner v. New York, 198 US 45 (1905). 
 297 S. Pac. Co., 325 U.S. at 779; accord Bibb, 359 U.S. at 525; Morgan, 328 U.S. at 383. 
 298 Pike, 397 U.S. at 145. 
 299 Morgan, 328 U.S. at 374. 
 300 Id. 
 301 Id. at 373. 
 302 Id. at 374–75. I have sometimes criticized the traditional case method’s propensity to condi-
tion students to view litigants as abstract subjects—the legal equivalent of lab rats—that exist only to 
illustrate the application of legal principles. I believe that human dignity animates the Constitution and 
that cases should be understood as much for their real-world impact on the litigants as for the rules 
they produce. Mrs. Morgan’s story demonstrates this principle as well as any in the United States 
Reports. 
 303 Id. at 380, 386. 
 304 Id. at 380. 
 305 Id. at 383. 
 306 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 1 (1967). 
 307 Id. at 7. 
 308 Id. at 11. 
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ly restrictive laws, like Virginia’s, impeded “interstate travel” and thus substan-
tially “interfere[d] with commerce.”309 Because Virginia’s law failed to effec-
tuate any legitimate local public interest—and, in fact, produced negative local 
affects—the Court struck it down.310 
The Court deployed the balancing test to invalidate obstructionist state 
statutes twice more before Pike, striking Arizona’s law limiting freight trains to 
seventy cars in Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona in 1945,311 and Illinois’s infa-
mous “mud flaps” law in Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc. in 1959,312 which 
required trucks to be fitted with “contour” mud flaps rather than the “straight” 
flaps employed everywhere else.313 In both cases the Court noted that “state 
legislatures [enjoy] great leeway in providing safety regulations,”314 but ulti-
mately struck down the statutes because both proved to be more dangerous 
than the alternative.315 Arizona’s train-length law led railroads to run more 
trains, increasing “casualties within the state.”316 Indeed, “[t]he accident rate in 
Arizona [wa]s much higher than on comparable lines elsewhere, where there 
[wa]s no regulation of length of trains.” 317 Likewise, Illinois’s required “use of 
the contour flap create[d] hazards previously unknown to those using the 
highways,” causing more highway deaths.318 Because these laws—like Virgin-
ia’s racist bus-seating statute—produced negative local effects and “severely 
burden[ed] interstate commerce,” both were stricken.319 
Finally, in Pike itself, the Court addressed an Arizona regulation that 
barred a cantaloupe grower that operated farms on both the Arizona and Cali-
fornia banks of the Colorado River from packaging its Arizona-sourced melons 
at its packaging facility on the California side of the river.320 The putative local 
interest in the measure was to ensure that cantaloupes grown on the Arizona 
side—which were melons “of exceptionally high quality”—did not “bear the 
name of their California packer.”321 Cantaloupes packaged on the Arizona side 
                                                                                                                           
 309 Morgan, 328 U.S. at 386. 
 310 Id. 
 311 S. Pac. Co., 325 U.S. at 779. 
 312 Bibb, 359 U.S. at 529. 
 313 Id. at 522, 529. 
 314 Id. at 530; accord S. Pac. Co., 325 U.S. at 770. 
 315 Bibb, 359 U.S. at 525; S. Pac. Co., 325 U.S. at 778. 
 316 S. Pac. Co., 325 U.S. at 778. 
 317 Id. 
 318 Bibb, 359 U.S. at 525 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Navajo Freight Lines, Inc. 
v. Bibb, 59 F. Supp. 385, 391 (S.D. Ill. 1958)). 
 319 Id. at 528; accord S. Pac. Co., 325 U.S. at 779. 
 320 Pike, 397 U.S. at 139–40. 
 321 Id. at 144. 
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would be labeled as Arizona-grown and thus “enhance the reputation of [other] 
growers within the State.”322 
In contrast to the “dubious” local benefits conferred by the statutes in 
Morgan, Southern Pacific, and Bibb,323 the Pike Court found that Arizona’s 
“asserted state interest [was] a legitimate” albeit “tenuous” one.324 Nonethe-
less, the Court found that the burden the regulation imposed on interstate 
commerce, requiring the construction of “an unneeded $200,000 packing 
plant”—more than $1.2 million in today’s dollars325—was clearly excessive in 
relation to its local benefit.326 
C. How Does Pike Apply to State Laws Regulating Out-of-State  
Marijuana Transactions? 
Many prohibitionist state laws banning the sale of marijuana in pot-
friendly states to the prohibitionist state’s citizens would survive “the deferen-
tial Pike balancing test.”327 Pike noted that “the extent of the burden that will 
be tolerated will . . . depend on the nature of the local interest involved . . . .”328 
In particular, the Court has recognized that in balancing the local benefits of a 
state’s law against its interstate burdens, “the peculiarly local nature of th[e] 
subject of safety” dictates that laws enhancing local public safety bear the most 
weight.329 Such “measures carry a strong presumption of validity . . . .”330 
A Nebraska statute banning pot sales in Colorado to visiting Huskers 
would constitute a quintessential safety measure. At least one study suggests 
that since Colorado first permitted the commercial sale of marijuana, the state 
has witnessed a ninety-two percent increase in fatal car accidents involving 
stoned drivers.331 Because marijuana purchased at dispensaries is not con-
sumed on site,332 Nebraskans who buy Colorado pot are likely to consume the 
                                                                                                                           
 322 Id. at 143. 
 323 S. Pac. Co., 325 U.S. at 779; accord Bibb, 359 U.S. at 525; Morgan, 328 U.S. at 383. 
 324 Pike, 397 U.S. at 145. 
 325 Consumer Price Index Inflation Calculator, BUREAU LAB. STAT., https://data.bls.gov/cgi-
bin/cpicalc.pl?cost1=200%2C000.00&year1=1970&year2=2017 [https://perma.cc/8KDF-8J6H] (last 
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 326 Pike, 397 U.S. at 145. 
 327 See Tenn. Scrap Recyclers Ass’n v. Bredesen, 556 F.3d 442, 449 (6th Cir. 2009). 
 328 Pike, 397 U.S. at 142. 
 329 Bibb, 359 U.S. at 523. 
 330 Id. at 524. The Court also observed that “[t]he various exercises by the States of their police 
power stand . . . on an equal footing. All are entitled to the same presumption of validity when . . . 
measured against the Commerce Clause.” Id. at 529. 
 331 ROCKY MOUNTAIN HIGH INTENSITY DRUG TRAFFICKING AREA, supra note 19, at 1. 
 332 But see W. David Ball, Bring Back the Opium Den: Column, USA TODAY (Feb. 11), 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2015/02/11/marijuana-legislation-recreation-legalized-drug-
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drug in Nebraska,333 leading to more drugged-driving accidents in Nebraska.334 
Moreover, even weed consumed by Nebraskans in Colorado poses public-
health concerns for Nebraska. 
Severe marijuana abuse causes “long-lasting changes in brain function 
that can jeopardize educational, professional, and social achievements.”335 Im-
aging studies of regular pot users’ brains reveal “decreased activity in prefron-
tal regions and reduced volumes in the hippocampus”336 leading to “impaired 
neural connectivity . . . in specific brain regions”—particularly those responsi-
ble for “learning and memory” and “self-conscious awareness.”337 This can 
cause “impairments in memory and attention,” and “significant declines in 
IQ.”338 Those who become dependent on marijuana as adolescents can lose up 
to eight IQ points by the time they reach adulthood.339 These “changes in brain 
function” yield predictable negative social consequences.340 Frequent marijua-
na use leads to “lower income, greater need for socioeconomic assistance, un-
employment, criminal behavior, and lower satisfaction with life.”341 
                                                                                                                           
alcohol-column/23254653/ [https://perma.cc/44DZ-PDSK] (lamenting that marijuana regulations “do 
not allow on-premises consumption in commercial establishments such as bars and restaurants” be-
cause “[t]he best way to limit diversion from the legal market to teens would be to shift all marijuana 
use, or at least as much as possible, to on-premises consumption”). 
 333 Visitors to Colorado who lack access to a private home have few places to smoke marijuana, 
as dispensaries do not generally permit on-site consumption, the state bans public cannabis consump-
tion, and most hotels prohibit smoking marijuana on their premises. Jordan Schrader, Law Has Barri-
er to Pot Tourism, NEWS TRIB. (Mar. 16, 2014), https://web.archive.org/web/20160410151241/http://
www.thenewstribune.com/news/politics-government/article25866484.html. 
 334 See Joanne E. Brady & Guohua Li, Trends in Alcohol and Other Drugs Detected in Fatally 
Injured Drivers in the United States, 1999–2010, 179 AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 692, 697 (2014) (finding 
that between 1999 and 2010, the number of fatally injured drivers who tested positive for marijuana 
tripled). 
 335 Volkow et al., supra note 18, at 2225. 
 336 Id. at 2220. 
 337 Id. 
 338 Id. at 2220, 2221; accord ROCKY MOUNTAIN HIGH INTENSITY DRUG TRAFFICKING AREA, 
supra note 19, at 36. 
 339 ROCKY MOUNTAIN HIGH INTENSITY DRUG TRAFFICKING AREA, supra note 19, at 36. 
 340 Volkow et al., supra note 18, at 2225; accord Budney et al., supra note 18, at 4. 
 341 Volkow et al., supra note 18, at 2221; accord Budney et al., supra note 18, at 8; see also De-
Veaux & Mostad-Jensen, supra note 6, at 1879. Congressional findings would also support Nebras-
ka’s assertion that laws barring Colorado pot sellers from transacting with Nebraskans promotes pub-
lic safety in Nebraska. See 21 U.S.C. § 801(2) (2012). Congress has condemned the marijuana trade as 
a nuisance, concluding that the “importation, manufacture, distribution, and possession” of marijuana 
has “a substantial and detrimental effect on the health and general welfare of the American people,” 
and that marijuana “distributed locally usually ha[s] been transported in interstate commerce immedi-
ately before [its] distribution,” and that the intrastate “distribution and possession of” marijuana “con-
tribute[s] to swelling the interstate traffic in such substances.” 21 U.S.C. § 801(2)–(4); see also De-
Veaux & Mostad-Jensen, supra note 6, at 1872–77 (arguing that Congress’s findings render Colora-
do’s venture a nuisance per se under the federal common law of nuisance). 
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In contrast to the “dubious” local benefits conferred by the statutes in 
Morgan, Southern Pacific, and Bibb,342 and the “tenuous” benefit conferred by 
Pike’s regulation,343 the Nebraska statute proposed above would constitute a 
true safety measure and would likely confer tangible benefits. 
A Nebraska statute penalizing its own citizens for using Colorado-sourced 
pot—even pot consumed in Colorado—would clear Pike’s hurdle. Such a law 
would convey local benefits to Nebraska by reducing drugged driving and by 
sparing the state some of the expenses associated with marijuana abuse.344 
These benefits would be balanced against the burden the law imposes on inter-
state commerce—chiefly the revenue that individual Colorado marijuana dis-
pensaries and Colorado tax collectors would lose if Colorado dispensaries can-
not transact with Nebraskans. 
Although Colorado’s lost tax revenue might constitute a meaningful hard-
ship for Pike purposes, the lost profits of individual pot sellers carries little or 
no weight in the analysis. As one court recently noted, because “[t]he Com-
merce Clause is not meant to be a safety net for individual out-of-state enti-
ties,” profits lost by vendors wishing to sell goods prohibited by a state’s law 
“can hardly be considered a burden for [DCC] purposes.”345 Although Colora-
do’s lost tax revenue would be far from de minimis, this burden would not be 
“clearly excessive in relation to [Nebraska’s] local benefits.”346 Colorado, after 
all, managed to function for more than a century without collecting any mari-
juana-related taxes.347 
A Nebraska law that imposes sanctions upon Colorado dispensaries 
transacting business with visiting Huskers would raise more pressing ques-
tions. Judge Sutton argued in his 2012 concurring opinion in American Bever-
age Association v. Snyder, that the Pike doctrine prevents a state from impos-
ing its own laws on merchants in other states who engage in transactions with 
                                                                                                                           
 342 S. Pac. Co., 325 U.S. at 779; accord Bibb, 359 U.S. at 525; Morgan, 328 U.S. at 383. 
 343 Pike, 397 U.S. at 145. 
 344 Volkow et al., supra note 18, at 2226 (noting how legal drugs may be more dangerous than 
illegal drugs because legal status allows for more “widespread exposure”). As some scholars have 
noted, “As policy shifts toward legalization of marijuana, it is reasonable and probably prudent to 
hypothesize that its use will increase and that, by extension, so will the number of persons for whom 
there will be negative health consequences.” Id. 
 345 Perfect Puppy, Inc. v. E. Providence, 98 F. Supp. 3d 408, 417–18 (D.R.I. 2015) (citing Pharm. 
Care Mgmt. Ass’n v. Rowe, 429 F.3d 294, 313 (1st Cir. 2005)). 
 346 See Pike, 397 U.S. at 142. 
 347 Colorado’s marijuana taxes offset the intrastate harm caused by its marijuana-legalization 
experiment. Because Colorado’s experiment causes transboundary harm, but the state does not share 
any of the proceeds of its experiment with its neighbors, Colorado’s lost tax revenue, in my view, 
should not qualify as a burden for DCC purposes. 
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the regulating state’s citizens.348 He stated, “Even if Ohio, for instance, made it 
illegal for its citizens to gamble, the State could not prosecute Nevada casinos 
for letting Buckeyes play blackjack.”349 Curiously, Judge Sutton relied upon 
the Seventh Circuit’s 2010 opinion in Midwest Title Loans, Inc. v. Mills350 to 
support this proposition.351 In Mills, Judge Posner, writing for the court, indeed 
posited that a hypothetical Indiana law punishing out-of-state casinos for 
“do[ing] business with residents of Indiana” would run afoul of the DCC.352 
But he did not rely on Pike’s anti-obstructionist test for this proposition. Ra-
ther, citing the Court’s decisions in Healy v. Beer Institute, Inc. in 1989 and 
Brown-Forman in 1986, Judge Posner asserted that such a law would be “in-
validated without a balancing of local benefit against out-of-state burden” be-
cause the DCC’s extraterritoriality doctrine prohibits state laws that “[directly] 
regulate activities in other states.”353 
A Nebraska law subjecting Colorado vendors to strict liability whenever 
marijuana they sell ends up in Nebraskan hands would impermissibly burden 
interstate commerce. Sellers would be unable to safeguard themselves against 
straw purchasers and Nebraskans who fraudulently procured Colorado identi-
fication. Imposing strict liability would likely force many dispensaries out of 
business, impeding Colorado’s policy of ensuring that “[l]egitimate, taxpaying 
business people, and not criminal actors, will conduct sales of marijuana” in 
the state.354 
Such a law would also likely run afoul of the Due Process Clause.355 The 
Clause imposes “modest restrictions” on the extraterritorial reach of a state’s 
law,356 limiting its application to transactions with which the state has “a sig-
nificant contact or significant aggregation of contacts . . . creating state inter-
ests . . . .”357 Such contacts exist with regard to any transaction involving a par-
                                                                                                                           
 348 Am. Beverage Ass’n v. Snyder, 700 F.3d 796, 814 (6th Cir. 2012) (Sutton, J., concurring), 
opinion amended and superseded, 735 F.3d 362 (6th Cir. 2014). 
 349 Id. 
 350 Midwest Title Loans, Inc., 593 F.3d at 666. 
 351 Am. Beverage Ass’n, 700 F.3d at 814 (Sutton, J., concurring) (citing Midwest Title Loans, Inc., 
593 F.3d at 666). 
 352 Midwest Title Loans, Inc., 593 F.3d at 666. 
 353 Id. (emphasis added) (citing Healy v. Beer Inst., Inc., 491 U.S. 324, 337 (1989); Brown-
Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 582–84 (1986)). 
 354 See COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, § 16(1)(b)(IV). 
 355 See U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1. 
 356 Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 818 (1985); accord Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 
449 U.S. 302, 312–13 (1981) (plurality opinion). 
 357 Shutts, 472 U.S. at 821 (1985) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Hague, 449 U.S. at 
313) (plurality opinion)).  
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ty who is a citizen of the regulating state at the time of sale.358 But due process 
also protects litigants from “unfair surprise.”359 Although a merchant who sells 
goods to a known Nebraskan must anticipate that Nebraska law could apply to 
their transaction,360 a Colorado business that transacts with a Nebraskan it rea-
sonably believes to be a Coloradan would be “unfairly surprised” by the appli-
cation of Nebraska law.361 
In contrast, a Nebraska statute punishing Colorado dispensaries that sell 
pot to consumers they know or have reason to know are Huskers would not 
subject vendors to “unfair surprise”362 or impose “clearly excessive” burdens 
on interstate commerce.363 Colorado law dictates that “[p]rior to initiating a 
sale, the employee of the retail marijuana store making the sale shall verify 
that the purchaser has a valid identification card showing the purchaser is 
twenty-one years of age or older.”364 A dispensary transacting with someone 
who presents Nebraska-issued identification will be on notice that it is trans-
acting with a Nebraskan.365 Requiring marijuana vendors to decline to sell pot 
to individuals who present such identification would therefore not impose any 
additional burdens upon sellers. Sellers are already obligated to require pro-
spective purchasers to present identification and to turn away customers who 
are too young or who lack identification. 
CONCLUSION 
As Justice Cardozo observed long ago, if the Constitution left the states 
free to sabotage their neighbors’ ventures by “project[ing] [their] legislation 
into [neighboring states],” then “the door [will be] opened to rivalries and re-
prisals that were meant to be averted by subjecting commerce between the 
states to the power of the nation.”366 The Tenth Circuit and Justice Gorsuch, in 
their haste to affirm what they likely viewed as socially beneficial legislation, 
                                                                                                                           
 358 See Shutts, 472 U.S. at 842 n.24 (Stevens, J., concurring); see also Cap Gemini Ernst & 
Young, U.S., L.L.C. v. Nackel, 346 F.3d 360, 366 (2d Cir. 2003); Nw. Airlines, Inc. v. Astraea Avia-
tion Servs., Inc., 111 F.3d 1386, 1394 (8th Cir. 1997). 
 359 Hague, 449 U.S. at 318 n.24 (plurality opinion). 
 360 Id.; see also Shutts, 472 U.S. at 842 n.24 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 361 See Hague, 449 U.S. at 318 n.24 (plurality opinion). As a practical matter, Nebraska’s courts 
may have difficulty exercising personal jurisdiction over Colorado pot vendors if Nebraska prosecu-
tors attempt to enforce their State’s law. Thus, if a Nebraska Grand Jury indicts a Coloradan, the dis-
pute could test the limits of the Extradition Clause. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 2. Because Ne-
braska is most likely to pursue pot vendors operating near the states’ border, it is likely that dispensary 
employees will sometimes enter Nebraska and be subject to personal service or arrest. 
 362 See Hague, 449 U.S. at 318 n.24 (plurality opinion). 
 363 See Pike, 397 U.S. at 142. 
 364 COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-43.4-402(3)(b)(I) (2017). 
 365 See Hague, 449 U.S. at 318 n.24 (plurality opinion). 
 366 Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 521–22 (1935). 
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failed to heed this lesson. Hopefully, the Supreme Court will set things right, 
sparing us from a return to the “rivalries and reprisals” that nearly doomed our 
nation in its infancy. 
